Fiscal-Monetary Activism: Some Analytical Issues by Arthur M. Okun




Some  Analytical  Issues 
IN  RECENT  YEARS,  ECONOMISTS have intensely  debated  the appropriate 
degree  of activism  in fiscal-monetary  policy  making.  The "new  economics" 
of the 1960s  emphasized  activism,  particularly  in fiscal  policy,  relying  "less 
on the automatic  stabilizers  and more on discretionary  action  responding 
to observed  and forecast  changes  in the economy-less on rules  and more 
on men."l When  the economy's  performance  deteriorated  after 1965,  the 
activism  of the policy strategy  came under  attack.  In particular,  the dis- 
satisfaction  led to a renewed  espousal  of rules  for policy such as had long 
been advocated  by Milton  Friedman  for monetary  policy and by Herbert 
Stein  for fiscal  policy.2 
The critics  of activism  argue  that changes  in fiscal  and monetary  instru- 
ments designed  to narrow  deviations  of the economy  from a target  path 
are likely  to widen  them instead,  whereas  the maintenance  of appropriate 
fixed  instrument  settings  would  achieve  greater  economic  stability.  Specifi- 
cally, the critics  question  the contribution  of fiscal  activism  to the success 
story of the early sixties and emphasize  that economic  performance  was 
* I am indebted  to Robert  E. Litan for assistance  in the research,  and to George Jaszi 
and several of the senior advisers  and members  of the Brookings  Panel on Economic 
Activity for helpful  comments. 
1. Walter  W. Heller,  New Dimensions  ofPolitical  Economy  (Harvard  University  Press, 
1966; W. W. Norton, 1967), pp. 68-69. 
2.  Milton Friedman,  "A Monetary  and Fiscal Framework  for Economic  Stability," 
American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 38 (June 1948),  pp. 245-64; Committee  for Economic 
Development,  Taxes  and  the  Budget:  A Program  for Prosperity  in a Free  Economy  (CED, 
November 1947).  Herbert  Stein was research  economist for the CED at that time. 
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unsatisfactory during the late sixties in the face of major shifts in fiscal and 
monetary  policy.3  I have participated  in this dialogue,  arguing  that the 
lessons of  1965-68 have been misread by the critics of activism. During 
this period, actual fiscal policy diverged from the policies recommended by 
activist economists inside and outside the government. Uncertainty and 
political unrest over the war overrode the activist prescriptions and would 
equally have overriden prescriptions for maintaining fixed fiscal-monetary 
settings.4 
This paper covers the same basic issue of activism versus rules, but it 
seeks to identify the analytical issues in the debate and to relate them to an 
important theoretical literature on decision strategy in policy making. I 
shall appraise the case against activism, which is a set of several related, 
and yet separate, charges. A selection of quotes from the critics may illus- 
trate these charges. Milton  Friedman points  out  the limitations in  our 
'ability to predict both the behavior of the system in the absence of action 
and the effect of  action" and the time-consuming process of correcting 
deviations which involves three types of lags: "(1) the lag between the need 
for action and the recognition of this need; (2) the lag between recognition 
of the need for action and the taking of action; and (3) the lag between the 
action and its effects."5 
Beryl Sprinkel stresses the inherent stability of  the private economy: 
"An activist monetary-fiscal policy  is  quite likely to  destabilize an  in- 
herently stable economy  .  .  .  6  One way it could do so is by disrupting 
private economic planning, as President Nixon  has noted: "Business and 
labor  cannot  plan,  and  consumers and  homebuyers cannot  effectively 
3. See, for example, Milton Friedman  and Walter W. Heller, Monetary  vs. Fiscal 
Policy (W. W. Norton, 1969). 
4. See Arthur  M. Okun, The  Political Economy  of Prosperity  (Brookings  Institution, 
1970), pp. 37-44, 53-59, 62-99, and 109-18; Okun, "Rules and Roles for Fiscal and 
Monetary  Policy,"  in James  J. Diamond  (ed.), Issues  in Fiscal  and Monetary  Policy: The 
Eclectic  Economist  Views  the  Controversy  (DePaul University,  1971)  (Brookings  Reprint 
222), pp. 51-74; Okun, "Political Economy: Some Lessons of Recent Experience," 
Journal  of Money, Credit  and Banking,  Vol. 4 (February  1972),  pp. 23-39. 
5. Milton Friedman,  "The Effects of a Full-Employment  Policy on Economic Sta- 
bility: A  Formal Analysis," in Essays in Positive Economics  (University of Chicago 
Press, 1953), p. 129. 
6. Testimony  of Beryl W. Sprinkel  on February  17, 1967, in The 1967 Economic  Re- 
port of the  President,  Hearings  before  the Joint Economic Committee,  90 Cong. 1 sess. 
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manage their affairs, when Government alternates between keeping first 
the accelerator and then the brake pedal to the floor."7 
According to  another strand of the argument, the political process is 
irrational or inefficient. The Council of Economic Advisers contends: "A 
policy of ad hoc decisions about deficits or surplus is exposed to the politi- 
cal bias in favor of spending and deficits."8 Similarly, Friedman posits a 
"propensity  to overreact"  by the monetary authorities stemming from their 
"failure ...  to allow for the delay between their actions and the subsequent 
effects on the economy."9 
In surveying the issues of  stabilization strategy, I shall highlight the 
question of how much to vary fiscal-monetary  instruments  for stabilization, 
rather than how to select instruments or to combine them. In particular, 
I shall not engage in invidious comparisons of fiscal and monetary policy. 
Whether good fiscal policy is more or less effective than good monetary 
policy for stabilization purposes is like the question of whether good head- 
lights are more or less important than good brakes for night driving. For- 
tunately, neither the stabilization policy maker nor the driver has to make 
such a choice. 
Many of the statements below are best interpreted  as though stabilization 
policy relied on a single instrument, which is aimed at a single target, some 
real or nominal level of gross national product (GNP).  I assume that an 
ideal level of GNP  has been selected and handed to the fiscal-monetary 
policy maker because I want to finesse "Phillips curve" issues, simply to 
keep this paper's scope within manageable bounds.  In effect, I am dis- 
tinguishing conceptually (and artificially) between two branches of macro- 
economic policy: The first is concerned with ways to alter, or to compro- 
mise on, the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff; while the second is charged 
with achieving the  optimum path of  economic  activity given the  prior 
choices on the tradeoff. In restricting this paper to the second branch, I 
shall obviously sacrifice coverage of many important interrelationships  be- 
tween the tradeoff and fiscal-monetary choices. 
7.  Economic Report of the President together with the Annual Report of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, Februiary  1970, p. 10. Hereafter, this document  will be referred to as 
either  the Econiomic  Report of the President  or the Annual Report of the CEA, followed by 
the year. 
8.  Annlulal  Report of thle CEA, January 1972, p. 112. 
9.  Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," in The Optimum  Quantity  of 
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The area covered by this paper is mined with loaded semantics. People 
who dislike activism often call it "fine tuning," a term with a pretentious 
ring. The Ackley Council of Economic Advisers used the obviously lauda- 
tory phrase "sensible steering" to describe its strategy, contrasting it with 
the  clearly inferior alternative of  "aimless drifting."'0 I  shall  use  the 
neutral (if inelegant) term "activism" to denote a fiscal-monetary strategy 
of pursuing some target path of national output by adjusting instruments 
in light of recent and expected changes in economic activity. 
I shall contrast activism with reliance on nondiscretionary rules that 
would fix fiscal and monetary settings with no feedback from changes in 
economic activity. To be sure, the proponents of rules welcome the benefits 
of certain automatic shifts induced by changes in economic activity, such 
as the rise in the actual budget surplus and in interest rates that a rapid 
expansion creates when the high employment budget surplus and money 
growth are fixed. But they want to focus on indicators that could be and 
would be held constant in the face of economic fluctuations. Obviously, 
nondiscretionary rules could include feedback; for example, the growth 
rate of money might be set equal to the unemployment rate. I concentrate 
below on rules that do not involve feedback simply because those are the 
rules espoused by the critics of activism. In that sense, the key issue in the 
debate is not the exercise of judgment, but rather the appropriate magni- 
tude of fiscal and monetary swings. Again, in the spirit of the recent dis- 
cussion, I shall suppose that any fixed rules for monetary policy would 
focus on some monetary aggregate rather than on interest rates. 
Assumptions  for Prototype Worlds 
THE ACTIVIST'S  PARADISE 
It may help to convey the limitations  that the real world imposes on 
an activist strategy to specify first a set of sufficient  conditions under which 
it would not be subject to any limitation and the policy maker could be 
sure of hitting his target precisely. First, the policy maker must be endowed 
with perfect foresight of private demand and supply and of the impact of 
10. Testimony of Gardner  Ackley.  on June 27, 1967, in Economic  Outlook  and Its 
Policy Implications,  Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee,  90 Cong. 1 sess. 
(1967), p. 13. Arthur  M. Okun  127 
any fiscal-monetary  actions.  The perfect  foresight  should extend  over the 
period  during  which  the instruments  would  exert  their  effects  on the econ- 
omy; but such dynamic issues can be conveniently  assumed away by 
pretending  either  that the world  is static in the sense of being timeless  or 
else that it contains  only a single time period with no relevant  horizon 
beyond.  Second,  achieving  an ideal  level of GNP should  be the only con- 
cern  of the policy  maker.  Third,  he must  be able  to control  his instruments 
precisely,  with no costs imposed  in setting  or changing  them. Finally,  the 
instruments  must  be sufficiently  potent  to keep GNP on target  regardless 
of the past and present  strength  of private  demand. 
Under  such  conditions,  the  right  amount  of action  could  always  be calcu- 
lated  and  implemented.  If some  initial  setting  of the fiscal-monetary  instru- 
ment would produce  a GNP differing  from the target level, the policy 
maker  would divide  the deviation  or "gap"  (D) by the known  multiplier 
(k) on his tax, expenditure,  money,  or interest  rate  instrument,  in order  to 
determine the correct change in the policy instrument (AP): AP =  -  D/k. 
Such is the activist's  paradise,  and like any paradise,  it is distant from 
reality. 
THE RULE  PROPONENT'S  MODEL WORLD 
No proponent  of rules  has specified  the assumptions  that would make 
fixed settings optimal. Of course, the rules proponent  emphasizes  that 
paradise  does not exist  and that we will be worse  off if we act as though  it 
did. But fixed  fiscal-monetary  settings  are not the only alternative  to the 
strategy  of the activist's  paradise.  Indeed,  the world  in which  they would 
be optimal  is not really  the polar opposite  of the activist's  paradise.  For 
example,  under  conditions  of complete  ignorance,  as contrasted  with the 
perfect  foresight  of the activist's  paradise,  the instruments  would  appear  to 
be unrelated  to economic  activity  and no presumption  would  be created  in 
favor  of keeping  them  steady. 
The optimality  of fixed settings  depends  on a set of assumptions  that 
might run along the following  lines: First, private  demand  is inherently 
stable.  In the absence  of shifts  in policy, it would tend toward  some equi- 
librium  path;  that path  would  be optimal,  at least for some settings  of the 
fiscal-monetary  instruments;  and deviations  from that path would dis- 
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policies and private demand must be known reliably so that proper settings 
can be determined. Third, the short-run impacts of the instruments must 
be subject to substantial uncertainty so that it will not pay to change the 
settings temporarily. Finally, the policy maker is able to maintain the fixed 
settings without cost. Under such a set of assumptions, changing policies 
could produce only trivial stabilization benefits and might impose large 
costs. 
The central portion of this paper relaxes, one at a time, the key assump- 
tions of the activist's paradise, and thus introduces a number of complexi- 
ties of the real world that are emphasized by the proponents of rules. I then 
examine the resulting implications for the optimum conduct of fiscal-mone- 
tary policy and in particular  the extent to which they point in the direction 
of fixed settings. Although at times I focus the analysis on the assumptions 
of the rule proponent's model world, I carry out that exercise much less 
thoroughly, simply because I have not found a neat package of sufficient 
conditions for that world. The resulting asymmetry troubles me on esthetic 
grounds, but I believe it reflects the spirit of the recent debate rather than 
my personal judgments. The rules proponents have stressed the pitfalls of 
activism rather than the glories of fixed settings; their case for rules is, by 
and large, the case against departing from them. 
Instrument  Costs 
INSTRUMENTS  AND  MULTIPLE TARGETS 
In stating sufficient conditions for the activist's paradise, I assumed that 
the policy maker is concerned only with the stabilization goal. Obviously, 
many other goals of economic policy are important. But paradise could, in 
principle, exist with multiple goals, so long as the available instruments 
were sufficient  in number and in potency to achieve them all. Consider, for 
example, the social goal of income distribution: Society might have both 
the income distribution it wants and the aggregate activity it wants, pro- 
viding the structure of taxes, transfer payments, and subsidies could be 
adjusted to alter income distribution without affecting aggregate demand 
and supply. 
As Tinbergen has shown, a necessary condition for the reliable achieve- 
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number  of targets."  When,  however,  the number  of instruments  is smaller 
than the number  of targets,  paradise  is supplanted  by a world of tough 
compromises,  which  have been discussed  analytically  by Henri  Theil.12  If 
a stabilization  instrument  had no significant  effect on any other social 
target,  that  instrument  could  be devoted  singlemindedly  to the stabilization 
effort.  And if it were  sufficiently  potent,  the activist's  paradise  for stabiliza- 
tion policy  might  still be salvaged.  Obviously,  however,  every  stabilization 
instrument  does have significant  side effects  on such social goal variables 
as resource  allocation,  the composition  of output,  the balance  of payments, 
the growth  of productive  capacity,  and wealth.  So long as society  cannot 
hit the bull's  eye on all its targets,  and  so long as some  departure  from  any 
fiscal-monetary  policy that is ideal  for the stabilization  goal would  permit 
closer  approaches  to other  targets,  stabilization  must  be compromised,  in 
general.  For example,  if the only available  ways  to restrain  excess  demand 
would  involve  either  a level of government  expenditures  below the social 
target  for the public  sector  or a level of real  interest  rates  too high for the 
ideal composition  of output,  the optimal  compromise  would typically  in- 
volve  some  undesired  inflation,  as well as a level of public  spending  below 
its ideal  and a level of real interest  rates  above  the ideal.13 
The division  of output  between  the public  and the private  sectors  em- 
bodies controversial  social preferences  that often constrain  or shape the 
course  of stabilization  policy. If government  expenditures  are the key in- 
strument  of demand  management,  the level of public spending  ideal for 
achieving  target  GNP may not be ideal for providing  the desired  flow of 
public  goods  and  services.  Indeed,  political  controversy  about  stabilization 
policy often combines  or confuses  stabilization  and compositional  objec- 
tives.  Proponents  of a larger  public  sector  sometimes  seize  the opportunities 
presented  by economic slack to promote  their compositional  objective, 
while  advocates  of cutbacks  in government  spending  may enthusiastically 
embrace  an anti-inflation  rationale  to serve  their  cause. 
11. J. Tinbergen,  Oni the Theory of Economic  Policy  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 
1963).  As the Phillips  curve dilemma reminds us, the condition is not sufficient.  For a 
given initial  real GNP and unemployment  rate, the amount of inflation  created  per unit 
of extra real GNP generated  by stimulative  fiscal-monetary  policy is not significantly 
different  for different  instruments. 
12. H. Theil, Economic Forecasts and Policy (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1958), pp. 
379-94. 
13. Some mathematical  illustrations  of such cases can be found in Charles  C. Holt, 
"Linear  Decision Rules for Economic  Stabilization  and Growth," Quarterly  Journal  of 
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Because  they avoid this problem  and controversy,  general,  across-the- 
board  changes  in income  tax rates  were  a particularly  appealing  counter- 
cyclical  tool in the eyes of the Commission  on Money and Credit14  and 
the economists  of the Kennedy  administration.  In my  judgment  they con- 
tinue  to be appealing.  Most recently,  the efficacy  of temporary  changes  in 
income  tax rates  has been  challenged  on the basis  of the permanent  income 
hypothesis,  but, as I have  argued  previously,  this  charge  is inconsistent  with 
a substantial  body of empirical  evidence.15  Of course,  both permanent  and 
temporary  changes  in income  tax rates  impinge  on other  social  goals, such 
as the market  valuation  of wealth,  the efficiency  of resource  allocation,  and 
(typically)  income  distribution  and  output  composition.  Still,  these  impacts 
seem  less significant  than  those  generally  associated  with  other  instruments 
of stabilization  policy. 
Several  types  of serious  conflicts  with other  goals may arise  from  mone- 
tary  policy  actions  that could  help  stabilize  economic  activity.  These  issues 
become  especially  important  in periods  of tight  money  because  losses  in the 
market  valuation  of wealth  impose  a welfare  cost, because  rises  in nominal 
interest  rates redistribute  income,  and because  tight money has a severe 
impact  on the share  of output  devoted  to homebuilding.  These  side effects 
of tight  money  explain  why  the 1966  performance  of the Federal  Reserve- 
which was magnificent  in terms of overall  stabilization-is held in such 
ill repute  and why the Federal  Reserve  refused  to give an encore  in late 
1967  and early  1968.16 
The side effects  thus argue  against  an activist  reliance  on tight  money  to 
curb excess  demand.  But they also argue  against  quantity-oriented  rules. 
Even  if monetary  policy  affects  GNP solely  through  the quantity  of money, 
it clearly  affects  nonstabilization  targets  through  both nominal  and real 
interest  rates and through the availability  of credit. Obviously,  steady 
money  growth  does not prevent  rising  interest  rates  if liquidity  preference 
strengthens  or if aggregate  demand  spurts  because  of a highly  stimulative 
fiscal  policy or an ebullient  private  economy. 
The proponent  of monetary  rules  can argue  that, with  steady  growth  of 
money, interest  rate variations  would be smaller  than those recently  ex- 
14. Money  and  Credit-Their Influence  on  Jobs,  Prices,  and  Growth,  The Report of the 
Commission  on Money and Credit  (Prentice-Hall,  1961),  pp. 133-37. 
15. Arthur  M. Okun, "The Personal  Tax Surcharge  and Consumer  Demand, 1968- 
70," Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1:1971), pp. 167-204. 
16. See my comments in "Rules and Roles for Fiscal and Monetary Policy," pp. 
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perienced  with a monetary  policy oriented  toward  rates.  As Fand points 
out, when the monetary  authorities  initially  accommodate  an excess de- 
mand inflation  because  they dislike  high interest  rates, they may subse- 
quently  have to resort  to especially  high nominal  interest  rates  (reflecting 
inflation  premiums)  in order  to achieve  the stabilization  task.17  Such an 
argument  charges  the policy makers  with myopia.  It cannot  deny that an 
optimal rational strategy  aimed at stabilizing  interest  rates should pay 
some attention  to the course of interest  rates as one of the proximate 
targets  even  if a quantity-oriented  strategy  is best  for stabilizing  GNP. How 
much weight  should  be given to interest  stability  as a social target'8  and 
how variable  money growth  would have to be for that reason  are issues 
that deserve  greater  attention  and more  sharply  focused  discussion.  But it 
should be clear that quantity-oriented  monetary  rules conflict  with non- 
stabilization  targets. 
In summary,  the effects  of stabilization  instruments  on other  social tar- 
gets  generally  imply  deviations  from  the activist's  paradise.  These  consider- 
ations  should  have  a major  influence  on the selection  and  mixture  of instru- 
ments, and they can also affect the desirable  magnitude  of restraint  or 
stimulus.  Probably,  a fiscal  policy  geared  to long-run  considerations  about 
tax structure  and demands  for collective  services  can satisfy  nonstabiliza- 
tion targets  reasonably  well; hence, any major departure  from the rules 
proponent's  fiscal  strategy  imposes  some costs  in compromising  those  other 
goals.19  But if the choice of fiscal  instruments  for stabilization  use is ad- 
justed to reflect  these considerations,  the costs should not be onerous.  In 
the case of monetary  policy, the costs of compromising  nonstabilization 
targets  may  be especially  large  if an activist  strategy  were  to rely  mainly  on 
tight  money  to restrain  excess  demand.  But they may also be sizable  when 
monetary  policy  follows  a rule  that  ignores  the social  preference  for interest 
rate  stability. 
In short, because  of the multiple  targets  of the real world, the policy 
maker  may  be led to trim  his fiscal  actions  somewhat  at times  in the direc- 
17. See David Fand, "Keynesian Monetary  Theories, Stabilization  Policy, and the 
Recent Inflation,"  Journial  of Moniey,  Credit anid  Banikinig,  Vol. 1 (August 1969), pp. 
556-61. 
18. See the views of Alvin H. Hansen, Tue  Aniericati  Ecotiomy  (McGraw-Hill,  1957), 
pp. 53-55. 
19. See, however,  the qualifications  in Paul A. Samuelson,  "Principles  and Rules in 
Modern  Fiscal  Policy: A Neo-Classical  Reformulation,"  in Monley,  Trade,  aid Economic 
Growth:  in Honior  of Johin  Heniry  Willianms  (Macmillan,  1951),  pp. 157-76. 132  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1972 
tion of the fiscal  rules.  But  the presence  of multiple  goals  suggests  a mix of 
fiscal  and monetary  policy  that would  stabilize  financial  conditions  as well 
as GNP, and points  away  from  quantity-oriented  monetary  rules. 
COSTS OF CHANGING  POLICIES 
In addition  to the possible  costs of operating  stabilization  instruments 
at levels that  compromise  other  goals,  certain  costs may  be associated  with 
changing  the settings  of the instruments. 
The  costs of change  have  a number  of dimensions.  Shifts  in fiscal  policies 
may  impair  the efficiency  of the public  sector.  For example,  a stabilization 
strategy  that turns on and off federal  programs  involving  purchases  of 
goods and services  may  create  inefficiencies  or impose  extra  costs in carry- 
ing out the objectives  of the programs. 
Since  time on the congressional  calendar  is a scarce  resource,  the legisla- 
tive process  to implement  fiscal  measures  imposes  some  cost. That  cost will 
be most significant  for tax and transfer  changes,  since Congress  reviews 
most federal  purchases  and grants  as a matter  of routine  each year  in the 
appropriations  process,  but reconsiders  the laws for taxes and transfer 
payments  only in the event of proposals  for alterations.  Moreover,  the 
legislative  cost of enactment  of a tax or transfer  change  has little to do 
with  its size and  is primarily  a fixed  or "set-up"  cost. In the case of a small 
program  that would otherwise  be desirable,  legislative  cost may tip the 
balance  from a "go" to a "no-go"  decision. 
Tax changes  can also impose costs on private decision makers.20  A 
major change in the tax base will surely  cause reappraisals  of business 
policies  and may require  considerable  efforts  to learn  the new rules  of the 
game.  Moreover,  if taxes  are restructured  frequently  for stabilization  pur- 
poses, uncertainty  about the tax laws will regularly  cast a shadow on 
private  decision  making. 
These  considerations  seem most serious  in the case of tax changes  that 
introduce  incentives  for the intertemporal  shifting  of outlays,  like coun- 
tercyclical  variations  in the investment  tax credit  or in excise  taxes. Such 
measures  are appealing  because  of their presumably  enlarged  m-ultiplier 
impact,  with substitution  effects  reinforcing  the normal  income  effects  of 
20. In order  to cover all aspects  of changing  settings,  the next several  paragraphs  al- 
low uncertainty  to creep in, even though the perfect foresight  assumption  of activist's 
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a tax rate change; the required dollar change in the instrument settings for 
any given stimulus or restraint is thereby made smaller. But the anticipa- 
tory effects of such practices are destabilizing-for  example, a slowdown in 
investment outlays is exacerbated if a weakening of the economy makes a 
temporary rise in the tax credit seem likely. A commitment to retroactivity 
can ameliorate the problem for a tax reduction, but, for a tax rise, retro- 
activity is universally rejected as inequitable.21 
Changes in income tax rates seem less subject to such problems. Antici- 
patory effects on spending decisions tend to be stabilizing: The expectation 
of a cut in rates will, if anything, spur outlays. Of course, the enactment 
of changes in tax rates will alter spending and hiring decisions; that cost is 
inevitable for any policy that successfully influences private demand. Some 
distortion of year-end accounting decisions is another adverse, but basi- 
cally negligible, cost of changing tax rates. 
In general, guessing what the government will do next involves expensive 
effort on the part of executives throughout the private sector, and this fact 
imposes costs on shifts in fiscal policies. But guessing where GNP is going 
absorbs even more private resources and creates even more serious anxie- 
ties. If the government can help to stabilize markets and incomes, it can 
reduce uncertainties rather than exacerbate them. Indeed, the statement of 
President Nixon quoted above can be reversed: If the government reliably 
alternates between pressing on the accelerator when the economy is going 
uphill and applying the brake pedal going downhill, it will aid private 
decision making. 
In summary, the maintenance of a fiscal rule (combined with a stable 
composition  of  expenditures and  taxes)  would  avoid  certain  costs  of 
changing instrument  settings that may be created by an activist fiscal policy. 
In particular, the set-up costs of legislation may swing the verdict in favor 
of  inaction when a small tax or transfer change would be desirable on 
stabilization grounds alone. More generally, the costs of change have im- 
portant implications for the choice of fiscal instruments,  cautioning against 
great reliance on  variations in government purchases and on  those tax 
changes that generate intertemporal substitution. But if these implications 
21. The recent  recommendation  of the Federal  Reserve  Board  for a cyclically  variable 
investment  tax credit raises  these concerns  in my mind-at  least pending  further  study 
and analysis.  See "Report  of the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System on 
Ways  to Moderate  Fluctuations  in the Construction  of Housing,"  staff paper  sent to the 
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are recognized  and if an activist  strategy  can help stabilize  economic  ac- 
tivity, the favorable  impact on private  planning  may turn the issue of 
instrument  changes  in favor  of fiscal  activism. 
So far as I can see, the costs of changing  instruments  have little rele- 
vance-either way-for  monetary  policy.  The Federal  Reserve  can take a 
great many small steps, if it so chooses, without  significant  set-up  costs. 
It can thereby  avoid  any major  anticipatory  problems.  To be sure,  because 
private  lenders  and  borrowers  have  to guess  the future  of interest  rates  and 
availability  (but  not the future  course  of the money  stock  directly),  a mone- 
tary policy that creates  predictable  cyclical  swings of interest  rates may 
generate  anticipatory  distortions  in the timing  of financing.  But it would 
probably  create much less distortion  in the timing of real investment 
activity. 
Uncertainty 
The recognition  of uncertainty  in stabilization  policy  making  marks  an- 
other  step away  from  the activist's  paradise  and  toward  reality.  In place  of 
perfect  foresight,  assume that the policy maker  can make an unbiased 
forecast  of GNP given  his policy  choices-his average  error  will be zero in 
the long run,  but the average  will consist  of offsetting  pluses  and minuses. 
Two types of uncertainty  about the private economy can be distin- 
guished: First, the policy maker cannot predict precisely  the inherent 
strength  of private  demand  (quite  apart  from  his choice  of fiscal-monetary 
policy); second,  he cannot  be certain  of the response  of GNP to the sta- 
bilization  instruments.  The interesting  result is that the first type barely 
influences  the optimal  fiscal-monetary  strategy,  while  the second  imposes 
a major  amendment.  Still  a third  type of uncertainty  reflects  the imperfect 
ability  of the policy maker  to control  the settings  of his own fiscal-mone- 
tary  instruments.  These  three  types  of uncertainty  will be discussed  in turn. 
In a world  of uncertainty,  it becomes  necessary  to specify  just how much 
the society (and presumably  the policy maker)  is hurt by deviations  of 
actual  GNP (Y) from  the target  (Y*). It is usual  to assume  that society  is 
"risk  averse,"  which  means  that, for example,  doubling  the deviation  from 
the target  more  than  doubles  the pain  or "welfare  loss"  (L): L[2(Y -  Y*)] 
> 2L( Y -  Y*) for Y P Y*.  It is particularly  convenient  to assume22  that  L 
22. This assumption goes back at least to  Friedman's  pioneer analytical article, 
"Effects  of a Full-Employment  Policy on Economic  Stability."  The quadratic  makes  the 
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is equal  to (or proportional  to) the squared  deviation  between  actual  GNP 
and the target:  L =  (Y  -  y*)2 
CERTAINTY  EQUIVALENCE 
For the present,  assume  that  the reliability  of the policy  maker's  forecast 
is independent  of the setting  of the instruments;  in other  words,  the fore- 
cast is subject  to the same  additive  or subtractive  error  in GNP, regardless 
of the policy chosen. This type of uncertainty  may still leave the policy 
maker  well advised  to act as though  his best forecast  were  a certain  fore- 
cast, even though  it is not.23 
Given the simple  quadratic  loss function  specified  above, the optimum 
strategy  to minimize  expected  welfare  loss is to set policy  instruments  such 
that the predicted  GNP (YP) for those settings  equals the target GNP 
(YP =  Y*). The squared  deviations  are minimized  when the expected  or 
mean distance  from the target  is made  zero, in the sense that pluses  and 
minuses  cancel  out.24  Since  the policy  maker  should  act as though  he were 
certain  of his forecast,  his optimum  strategy  is one of "certainty  equiv- 
alence."  The existence  of this type of uncertainty  will make the outcome 
less satisfactory  than in the activist's  paradise  (L cannot  be kept down to 
zero);  but the optimum  strategy  is still the one appropriate  to the paradise 
situation.  The more help the policy maker  can get from accurate  fore- 
casting,  the closer  to his  target  he can  expect  to get. But  greater  uncertainty 
about  the outlook  does not diminish  the premium  on corrective  action:  Al- 
though  it reduces  the likelihood  that policy action  will keep  the economy 
close to target,  it increases  the danger  that inaction may result  in a very 
large  deviation  from  target. 
This result does not depend  critically  on the quadratic  function.  For 
example,  if welfare  loss is proportional  to the absolute  deviation  of GNP 
from its target  (L =  -  Y*  I), the policy maker  should simply  use the 
median  (rather  than  the mean)  forecast  of GNP as his certainty  equivalent. 
Of course,  if forecast  errors  are viewed  as symmetrically  distributed,  the 
median  and  the mean  will  coincide  and  no modification  at all is implied.  If, 
23. See Theil, Econiomic Forecasts  anid  Policy, pp. 411-31, and Henri Theil, "Linear 
Decision Rules for Macrodynamic  Policy  Problems,"  in Bert  G. Hickman  (ed.), Quanti- 
tative  Planniinlg  of Economic  Policy, A Conference  of the Social Science  Research  Council 
Committee  on Economic  Stability  (Brookings  Institution,  1965),  pp. 18-37. 
24. This reflects  the fact that the sum of squared  deviations  of all observations  in a 
frequency  distribution  from any point is minimized  when that point is the mean of the 
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unlike these examples, society dislikes upward deviations from  Y* more 
(or  less) than  downward deviations  of  equal  size,  the  asymmetry will 
further modify the choice of the certainty equivalent, but it will not push 
the optimum strategy in the direction of rules. These results do depend 
on the availability of  some unbiased forecast to  the policy maker. The 
records of individual forecasters would not suggest that all are unbiased. 
Moreover, with an unbiased fiscal-monetary rule, a perennial forecast of 
no gap would be unbiased in the sense that it was as often too high as too 
low. But, whatever their limitations, professional forecasters can outper- 
form the naive forecast that, regardless of (Y  -  Y*) this year, it will be 
zero next year. 
With these  few  qualifications, imperfection in  the  ability to  forecast 
economic activity in the absence of policy action has virtually no  effect 
on the desirability of taking policy action. 
MULTIPLIER  UNCERTAINTIES 
Uncertainties concerning the impacts of changes in policy instruments 
introduce far more important amendments. Contrary to the assumptions 
of  the  certainty equivalence case,  the  forecaster cannot  predict GNP 
equally well (or equally badly) regardless  of the settings of the insfruments. 
Forecasters would be terribly uncertain if asked to  estimate next year's 
GNP on the assumption of a radical alteration in fiscal or monetary policy, 
such as a repeal of all income taxes or the doubling of the money supply. 
William  Brainard developed the  analysis  of  multiplier uncertainties, 
which had been previously mentioned by Friedman.25  If the policy maker 
cannot be sure of the size of the multiplier associated with his policy in- 
strument, then the greater  the departure  of that instrument  from its average 
or customary setting, the greater will be the uncertainty about GNP. This 
formulation assumes that some particular setting of the instrument min- 
imizes uncertainty about GNP. 
In a static world, the minimum uncertainty  position would be the average 
setting of the instrument during the historical sample period from which 
25. William Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness  of Policy," in American 
Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings  of the Seventy-ninth  Annual  Meeting, 
1966  (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 57, May 1967),  pp. 411-25; Friedman,  "Effects  of 
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the multiplier  was estimated, and would not necessarily  be close to the most 
recent setting. In a world of growth, however, some estimates of the mul- 
tiplier effects of instruments are derived from changes  in settings over time. 
In such cases, the average historical change represents minimum uncer- 
tainty. Thus, the nature of the statistical evidence underlying  the multiplier 
estimate determines whether minimum uncertainty is obtained at the aver- 
age historical level or the average historical change. The issue can be im- 
portant: Suppose the average full employment surplus through relevant 
history has been 1 percent of GNP and the average change has been zero; 
if the surplus is currently minus 1 percent of GNP,  it is critical whether 
minimum uncertainty would be attained by staying at minus 1 percent or 
by moving to plus 1 percent. 
Presumably  the proponent of rules would recommend a full employment 
surplus that was not vastly different from the historical average; further- 
more, his recommendation for no change in that surplus would closely 
correspond with the historical record which shows erratic ups and downs 
but  little  trend.  Similarly, the  proponent  of  monetary  rules  typically 
espouses a rate of growth of money and liquidity that is quite close to the 
historical average, as well as levels that are fairly customary in relation to 
GNP.  In that sense, obedience to  the rules would keep the instruments 
close to minimum uncertainty and finesse the problem of multiplier un- 
certainty. 
In the case of an activist strategy, if a policy action to make YP  equal to 
Y* required a major departure of the instrument from its setting of  min- 
imum uncertainty, that action would make the prediction of  GNP  less 
reliable. Compared with keeping the instrument at minimum uncertainty, 
the activist strategy will gain (or reduce loss) by closing the expected gap 
between Y and Y*, but will lose from the multiplier uncertainty, which is 
applied to  the distance of the instrument setting from its minimum un- 
certainty position. The added risk associated with multiplier uncertainty 
is costly whenever society is risk averse. If the policy maker starts with 
instruments at settings of minimum uncertainty, he is advised to exercise 
conservatism in his use of the instruments, always taking some action but 
a smaller action than would equate expected and target GNP. As Brainard 
shows, in the case of a quadratic loss function, one instrument, and in- 
dependence of the uncertainty concerning the multiplier from that associ- 
ated with the basic state of private demand, the optimum prescription  is to 
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ratio of the standard  deviation  of the estimate  of the multiplier  to the 
expected  value  of the multiplier.26  For example,  if the standard  error  is half 
the estimated  multiplier,  closing  four-fifths  of the gap is optimal. 
Diversification.  One interesting  implication  of multiplier  uncertainty  is 
that  it encourages  the use of a diversified  kit of instruments.  The  individual 
instruments  are generally  put to work in the same direction  of stimulus 
or restraint:27  Because  variance  increases  with the square  of the instru- 
ment move, two smaller  moves that operate  in the same direction  econ- 
omize on variance,  so long as the errors  in the two multiplier  estimates 
are not strongly  positively  correlated.  To the extent  that errors  in the esti- 
mated  impacts  of tax, expenditure,  and monetary  changes  are  not perfectly 
correlated,  optimum  use of a diversified  kit of instruments  yields  two kinds 
of benefits:  a reduction  in risk, and a reduction  in the expected  gap be- 
tween Y and Y*. When  the policy maker  chooses  combined  packages  of 
restrictive  (or stimulative)  tools, the benefits  and  costs of any  policy  should 
be viewed  as a characteristic  of the package  rather  than of its individual 
components.  That  implication  should  be recognized  in analytical  efforts  to 
appraise  the fiscal  and monetary  impacts  of combined  actions,  such  as the 
tax cut and monetary  accommodation  of 1964-65. 
With  respect  to monetary  policy,  the interpretation  of multiplier  uncer- 
tainty  depends  on whether  the money  supply  or interest  rates  is designated 
the instrument.  The criteria  for this choice,  which  have  been  spelled  out by 
Poole,28  can be described  in terms  of multiplier  uncertainty.  Presumably, 
the same  expected  GNP can  be obtained  by picking  an interest  rate  or pick- 
ing a money  supply.  The  reason  that one of these  choices  can  be preferable 
26. If D is the expected  gap between Y and Y*  for the minimum  uncertainty  setting, 
E is the expected  value operator,  and u is an additive  disturbance, 
E(L) = E(f  y  Y*)2  =  E(D +  kAP  +  U)2, 
Expected  loss can be minimized  by differentiating  with respect to AP and setting the 
derivative  equal to zero: 
E(kD +  k2AP  +  ku) =  0. 
If k and u are independent,  optimality  requires  that 
-1kD  -D/1k  _D  1 
AP  =- k2  +  2  =  2  3=  1ii 
+72')  k2?cTk  cTk  I  V 
27. Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness  of Policy,"  pp. 418-21. 
28. See William  Poole, "Optimal  Choice of Monetary  Policy Instruments  in a Sim- 
ple Stochastic Macro Model," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 84 (May 1970), 
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to the other on stabilization grounds is that the variance of GNP around 
that expected value will be smaller with the money instrument if the liquid- 
ity preference function is highly stable, or smaller with the interest rate 
instrument if the consumption and investment demand functions are very 
stable. The choice of the "superior"  instrument promotes greater activism, 
leading the policy maker to aim at closing more of any expected GNP gap. 
In summary,  a rule for steady  money  growth  could  avoid  multiplier  un- 
certainty if it aimed to maintain the historical average. Similarly, a fiscal 
rule that specified constancy of the high employment budget surplus could 
also  escape  multiplier uncertainty.29 Multiplier uncertainty upsets  the 
pleasant  and  appealing  solution  of  the  certainty-equivalence world.  It 
typically reduces the  appropriate degree of  activism, urging the  policy 
maker to take a step in the direction of the proponent of rules. But the step 
is generally a small one; the policy maker will generally wish to take action 
when any expected deviation between actual and target GNP is in prospect, 
and usually enough action to close the greater part of any expected gap. 
Moreover, as I shall show below, if the uncertainty about GNP stemming 
from policy actions can be made to neutralize  uncertainties  about the course 
of private demand, policy action can reduce total uncertainty as well as 
improve the expected outcome. Indeed, the major import of multiplier un- 
certainty may be its encouragement to the policy maker to design, select, 
and combine instruments in ways that permit the pursuit of target GNP 
without major vulnerability to variance. 
Finally, the important amendments imposed by multiplier uncertainty 
do not disturb one part of the certainty-equivalence  solution: The optimal 
strategy depends only on the policy maker's ability to forecast the incre- 
mental impacts of policy actions, and not on the accuracy of his forecast of 
demand for a given fiscal-monetary policy.30 
Dynamic multipliers. Multiplier impacts and uncertainties have impor- 
29. To do so, fiscal policy must also stabilize the composition of outlays and the 
structure  of tax revenues  in order to avoid multiplier  uncertainties  that are attached  to 
the movement  of various  types of expenditures  and taxes. 
30. In "Adaptive  Decision Rules for Macroeconomic  Planninig,"  Westernl  Economic 
Joiurn-al,  Vol. 9 (December  1971),  pp. 369-78, Edward  C. Prescott  introduces  a "learning 
by doing" consideration  into policy formulation.  He points out  that a large shift of the 
instrument  from its historical  average  movement  provides  substantial  additional  infor- 
mation  about its multiplier.  The value  of that extra  information  for future  policy making 
should encourage larger actions than the  Brainard model would imply, although 
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tant dynamic aspects, because the effect of a policy action on aggregate 
demand is spread out over time. A federal expenditure or an increment in 
money supply occurring in one quarter is likely to raise aggregate demand 
then and in several subsequent quarters. In particular,  the profile of period 
multipliers,  as statistically estimated, is often humped, starting small, rising 
to  a  peak,  then  declining, and  perhaps ultimately becoming  negative: 
k1 <  ...  <km>km+  >.... 
A humped profile of dynamic multipliers raises the possibility of "instru- 
ment instability," which has been analyzed by William Poole and Robert 
Holbrook.31 Suppose  the  policy  maker anticipates  a  temporary,  one- 
period shift in private demand that threatens to pull the economy above 
target by an amount D. If he uses an instrument with a humped dynamic 
multiplier to neutralize  the shift in private demand occurring in period one 
(-k,AP1  =  D) and thus hold the economy on target, the economy could 
threaten to move below target in period two by -k2AP1.  With k2 >  k1, a 
stimulative AP2 greater in absolute value than AP1 would be required to 
hold the economy on target. It is conceivable that ever larger oscillations 
of the instrument-such  that I  APt  -  >  I  APt-I  I  would be required simply 
to offset the previous policy actions touched off by a single wiggle in private 
demand. 
Instrument instability raises a new threat to the activist's paradise. It 
suggests that, even with no multiplier  uncertainties  and no instrument  costs, 
a policy of eliminating all gaps might not be sustainable over the long run 
because the  required instrument settings might diverge toward plus  or 
minus infinity. This analysis makes an important contribution; but, be- 
cause it is framed in a deterministic way and in the context of an infinite 
horizon, its real relevance may be obscured. The analysis draws a mathe- 
matical boundary line between stability (damped oscillations) and instabil- 
ity (antidamped oscillations), seeming to imply that the former region is 
perfectly safe and the latter necessarily perilous. In fact, if shifts of the in- 
struments had  no  costs  or  constraints, instrument instability and  the 
specter of infinity would not frighten the policy maker. After all, the instru- 
ments would take on infinite values only after an infinite length of time. 
31. William Poole, "Alternative  Paths to  a Stable Full Employment Economy," 
Brookings  Papers on Econiomic  Activity (3:1971), pp. 579-614; Robert S. Holbrook, 
"Optimal  Economic  Policy and the Problem  of Instrument  Instability,"  American  Eco- 
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Secondly, the analysis focuses on "blips" or wiggles in economic activity- 
one-period deviations that are self-correcting. As  discussed below, these 
are not the typical movements that challenge the policy maker. Moreover, 
the  humped pattern of  dynamic multipliers reflects the  quarterly time 
periods of the available data. The policy maker can remove the danger of 
instrument instability simply by  selecting a  somewhat longer  planning 
period-for  any empirical example I  know,  nine-month periods would 
make k1 the peak value of the period multiplier. 
On the other hand, the analysis of instrument instability points to the 
general problems of dealing with dynamic multiplier profiles, even if they 
satisfy the mathematical stability conditions. Wide swings in the instru- 
ments may still entail large costs as a result of the considerations discussed 
above: the effects on nonstabilization targets, the costs  of changing set- 
tings, and, most significantly, the Brainard multiplier uncertainties.32  In- 
deed, the  policy maker conscious  of  multiplier uncertainties will  avoid 
strategies that  would permit instrument instability to  become  a serious 
threat. In the first place, any strategy that relies on wide swings of instru- 
ments will be charged heavily for creating additional variance.  (The strategy 
of expected full adjustment in the appendix illustrates the costs of superfine 
tuning.) Second, statistical estimates will remind the alert policy maker of 
the major uncertainties  he faces with respect to the time pattern of dynamic 
multipliers.  The estimated standard  error of the multiplier on an instrument 
is smaller for, say, four quarters,  than for a single quarter. In light of these 
facts of economic life, the policy maker will plan over a horizon of several 
quarters and will be reluctant to chase transitory gaps. Only if he has con- 
fidence that the economy needs a major push initially will he adopt a stimu- 
lative policy today recognizing that it will probably require a neutralizing 
restraining action on some tomorrow. Such a strategy-which  has been 
derisively called "oversteering"-generally  imposes some instrument costs 
and some added multiplier uncertainty; but it can be worth those costs at 
times if it helps significantly to keep Y close to  P. 
32. Nor are the mathematical  stability  conditions  sufficient  reassurance  when instru- 
ments have "natural"  floors or ceilings, such as the constraints  that government  pur- 
chases must lie between  zero and total GNP and that the money supply  and the rate of 
interest  are intrinsically  nonnegative.  Furthermore,  nonlinearities  may limit the effec- 
tiveness of the instruments;  for example, in vertical  or horizontal  stretches  of liquidity 
preference  or marginal  efficiency  schedules, either fiscal or monetary  tools would be 
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INSTRUMENT  UNCERTAINTY 
The policy maker of the real world does not have perfect control over his 
fiscal and monetary instruments. The existence of instrument uncertainties 
imposes important modifications on both the activist's paradise and the 
rule proponent's model world.33 
Monetary policy.  Its susceptibility to control has sometimes been sug- 
gested as a criterion for the selection of a particular monetary instrument, 
reflecting Milton Friedman's dictum "that the monetary authority should 
guide itself by magnitudes that it can control, not by ones that it cannot 
control."34 Some  have criticized, as  inconsistent with  his  own  dictum, 
Friedman's preference for M as the instrument, contending that the Fed- 
eral Reserve lacks good control over the money stock, and should use as 
its instrument some monetary aggregate subject to more precise control, 
such as the monetary base or unborrowed reserves. But that argument does 
not rest on firm grounds, because Friedman's dictum is not reliable. The 
preferable instrument strategy is the one that exercises greater control on 
economic activity, and an instrument  subject to better control by the policy 
maker does  not  necessarily exert better control  over  Y.35  Suppose, for 
example, that Y is affected by M (directly or through interest rates) but is 
not independently affected by the monetary base or unborrowed reserves. 
Under those conditions, errors in M would be important and the absence 
of errors in the other aggregates would be irrelevant. Unless the errors in 
M emerging when M is the instrument were by some peculiarity associated 
with especially large errors in  Y, controlling M imperfectly would be su- 
perior to controlling perfectly the base or unborrowed reserves.36 
33. By Tinbergen's  definition,  an instrument  variable  must be subject  to "the com- 
mand of the government,"  which implies perfect control. I find this definition  incon- 
veniently  restrictive  and hence use the term instrument  to apply to anything  the policy 
maker  seeks to control directly.  See Tinbergen,  Oni  the Thleory  of Economic  Policy, p. 7. 
34. Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," p. 108. 
35. Friedman  himself  concludes that interest  rates should not be the instrument,  in 
part because  "....  monetary  policy cannot peg interest  rates...."  (Ibid.,  p. 101.)  Insofar 
as it pertains  to nominal (rather  than real) rates, that proposition simply  cannot stand 
empirical inspection: The Federal Reserve did peg the interest rates of  short-term 
Treasury  securities  for most of the decade  of the forties  and for a briefer  time in the early 
sixties. 
36. As I understand  existing open market operations, they include procedures to 
limit the variability  of money market  conditions and do not aim singlemindedly  at a 
target  M. I see good reasons  for cushioning  short-run  fluctuations  of interest  rates,  which Arthur  M. Okun  143 
Thus, in principle as well as in practice, monetary rules are bound to be 
framed in terms of an instrument subject to  only imperfect control. For 
that reason, the rules proponent is obliged to instruct the policy maker how 
to respond to errors or deviations in the instrument. If last month's money 
stock departed from its target, what adjustment is required for the target 
money stock this month? Surely, it cannot be  optimal to  maintain the 
initially intended target growth rate and thus to  permit the level of  the 
money stock to be permanently off track, as the emphasis solely on the rate 
of growth seems to imply. 
Fiscal policy.  Instrument uncertainty poses a different set  of  problems 
for the proponent of fiscal rules. The fiscal policy maker in the executive 
branch is exposed to many risks that may derail the budget, including un- 
anticipated changes in military spending and other uncontrollable outlays, 
or  congressional  action  inconsistent with  the  administration program. 
When  the  fiscal policy  maker who  espouses  rules is  thus  surprised or 
thwarted, he must take some new action in order to live by his own rules. 
Maintaining a given high employment surplus or a fixed position of any 
other fiscal indicator does not afford the policy maker a quiet life of inac- 
tion,  but  rather obliges  him  to  take  neutralizing action  whenever  the 
budget wanders off its track. 
Obviously, in practice, the rules proponent will not chase every small 
deviation in the budget; but his own principles require him to respond to 
major instrument deviations, when he would not respond to surprises of 
the same magnitude in private demand. If this asymmetry has a justifica- 
tion, I have yet to discover it. The neutralizing action in response to an 
instrument surprise involves the same types of instrument costs and the 
same degree of multiplier uncertainty that apply to fiscal actions intended 
to offset shortfalls or excesses of private demand. 
Instrument uncertainty is also a serious problem for the fiscal activist, 
who may often require prompt legislative approval of proposals. In view of 
the legislative uncertainties in fiscal policy, any monetary instrument is 
probably subject to greater short-run control and predictability than are 
fiscal variables. Hence, instrument uncertainty is one consideration that 
encourages the activist to alter monetary policy, 
may reflect  very temporary  shifts in liquidity  preference,  but these procedures  make it 
impossible  to judge how well the Federal  Reserve  could  control money, if that were its 
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Some activists have faced up to the problems of instrument  uncertainty- 
for example, by proposing mechanisms that would increase the speed of 
congressional verdicts on tax proposals. The rules proponents, on the other 
hand, have ducked these important issues, in my judgment. No  advocate 
of fiscal rules has explained how the commitment to respond to instrument 
deviations can be consistent with a uniform nonresponse to demand devia- 
tions. And no proponent of monetary rules has suggested procedures for 
dealing with situations when money goes off its track. 
The Issue of Self-correction 
Although the rules proponent recognizes that private demand will fluc- 
tuate to  some extent even if the monetary and fiscal rules are carefully 
obeyed, he views the economy as inherently stable in two senses: First, 
departures  from a reasonable target path are likely to be small unless policy 
is disruptive; second, GNP will tend to return promptly to its ideal path 
if it should wander somewhat off course. So far as I can see, the first of 
these propositions is not relevant to the formulation of a strategy by the 
policy maker on how he should respond to departures, when and if they 
occur. By analogy, the fireman must know what to  do  when the alarm 
rings, whether that happens frequently or hardly ever. 
The second proposition is, however, very important. It urges the policy 
maker not to respond to deviations, but rather to rely on snapback or self- 
corrective tendencies that prevail if monetary policy sticks to its fixed set- 
ting (M*) and fiscal policy to its rule (F*). A strong self-correction hypothe- 
sis might contend that, given M* and F*, the expected value of real GNP 
for any period beyond some horizon h is equal to Y* regardless of Y in the 
last observed period, where h is small relative to the time period of dynamic 
multipliers on fiscal-monetary instruments. This can be stated as follows: 
E( Yt+h  I  M*, F*, Yt1)  =  Yt+h 
and 
h 
E  ki << k, 
i=l 
where ki are period multipliers and k the total multiplier. 
If these conditions are met, the possible benefits of any corrective shift in 
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help. And the costs of a shift can be large because  any steering  is over- 
steering  in the sense  that an activist  restrictive  policy  would  exert  much  of 
its influence  after  excess demand  had disappeared,  thus creating  a future 
deflationary  backlash  that would require  costly neutralizing  stimulative 
actions. 
The premise  of self-correction  could rest  on price  flexibility.  If excessive 
or deficient  demand  triggers  off prompt  changes  in the price  level,  while  the 
nominal supply of money (or of net private  financial  wealth, so-called 
Patinkin  money)  remains  unchanged,  the real  stock may be sufficiently  al- 
tered  to restore  real aggregate  equilibrium.  This traditional  case for self- 
correction,  however,  gets no empirical  support  from  either  the grossest  ob- 
servations  or the most refined  analyses  of price behavior  in the modern 
American  economy.  Econometric  studies  of price  responsiveness  find  that 
the period of price adjustment  far exceeds multiplier  periods for fiscal- 
monetary  instruments.37 
Alternatively,  the thesis of self-correction  might  rest on the contention 
that  the income  velocity  of money  is highly  stable,  at least  after  allowing  for 
the effects of interest  rates, lags in the response  of spending  to money 
creation,  and any secular  trend.  In that case, any departure  of Y from Y* 
should  be interpreted  as transitory:  So long as M is kept equal  to M*, Y 
would  return  to Y*  as the transitory  deviation  in velocity  disappears. 
Such  a hypothesis  about  the stability  of velocity  has clear  empirical  im- 
plications:  If, given  the past  and  current  history  of M, A  Y  is unusually  large 
this quarter,  signifying  that velocity  has departed  upward  from its usual 
track,  then  A  Y in subsequent  quarters  should  be unusually  small,  given  M, 
as velocity  drops  back  to normal.  This translates  statistically  into the hy- 
pothesis  that the relationship  of A  Y to AM should generate  errors  with 
strongly  negative  serial  correlation. 
The equations  that I know relating  A  Y to AM  are  inconsistent  with  that 
hypothesis.  The St. Louis Federal  Reserve  model explains  the change  in 
GNP for a given  quarter  primarily  through  the changes  in money  in that 
quarter  and  several  previous  ones.  Its pattern  of errors  is essentially  random 
37. Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  Brookings  Papers  on 
Econiomic  Activity  (1:1971), pp. 136-42; Leonall  C. Andersen  and Keith M. Carlson,  "A 
Monetarist  Model  for  Economic  Stabilization,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St.  Louis 
Review,  Vol. 52 (April 1970), pp. 12-13. See also papers by Lawrence  Klein, Albert 
Hirsch,  George  de Menil and Jared Enzler,  and Saul Hymans,  in Otto Eckstein  (ed.), 
The Econiometrics  of Price Determinationi Coniferenice  (Board of Governors  of the Federal 
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through  time. Once  a shortfall  (overshoot)  of GNP is experienced  along  a 
given  money  path,  expected  changes of GNP in subsequent  quarters  are  un- 
affected  by the surprise  in the initial  quarter;  hence,  the levels of GNP esti- 
mated  for subsequent  quarters  remain  permanently  lower (higher)  by the 
amount  of the initial  deviation.  No snapback  in velocity  is found.38 
The same  finding  emerges  even more  dramatically  in the Laffer-Ranson 
model. Its explanation  of the quarterly  proportional  change  in nominal 
GNP relies  on the concurrent  proportional  change  in M as a key variable; 
lagged  changes  in M are found  to be unimportant  and do not appear.  Er- 
rors  in consecutive  quarters  are independent.  Accordingly,  the message  is 
that this quarter's  incremental  money  normally  adds substantially  to this 
quarter's  GNP; but, if it does not show up in GNP this quarter,  it prob- 
ably never Wil.39 
The evidence  of Keynesian  econometric  models is also relevant  to the 
self-correction  hypothesis.  They suggest  that deviations  from an expected 
path  of Y  typically  persist  for a long time,  given  an unchanged  stabilization 
policy. To be sure,  they identify  certain  types of deviations-basically  on 
the supply  side-that  have  little or no lasting  effect  on Y: A strike  of sub- 
stantial  size  and  duration  is the outstanding  example  of a situation  in which 
the conditions  for self-correction  are  likely  to be met. 
Deviations  in the strength  of final  demand,  however,  are  found  to be per- 
sistent  and  even  cumulative.  Suppose  an econometric  model  had  been  used 
to forecast Y for several  years  into the future.  Then suppose  that, in the 
initial  quarter,  some component  of final  demand  turned  out considerably 
stronger  than  expected.  The new  information  provided  by the actual  values 
of that quarter  would generate  a new forecast  that would lie above the 
initial  forecast  for a considerable  period  of time. 
One  reason  for the persistence  of deviations  is that  time  series  regression 
equations  explaining  levels  of demand  display  positive  serial  correlation  of 
errors.  In general,  when  consumer  demand  or investment  demand  is sur- 
prisingly  strong  (weak)  given  the explanatory  variables,  unusual  strength 
38. Andersen and Carlson, "Monetarist Model," p.  11, and Keith M. Carlson, 
"Projecting  with the St. Louis Model: A Progress  Report,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. 
Louis  Review,  Vol. 54 (February  1972),  p. 26. The Durbin-Watson  statistic  is 1.80 for the 
sample period 1953:1 to 1969:4, and 2.12 for the period 1953:1 to 1971:2, both ex- 
tremely  close to the 2.00 value of perfect  randomness. 
39. Arthur B. Laffer and R. David Ranson, "A Formal Model of the Economy," 
Journal  of Business,  Vol. 44 (July 1971),  pp. 251-52. The Durbin-Watson  statistic  for the 
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(weakness)  is also observed  in the next quarter.  Some econometric  models 
build  in explicit  correcting  mechanisms,  using  the errors  of recent  quarters 
as explanatory  variables;  others  do so less explicitly  by using  lagged  con- 
sumption  (for example)  as an explanatory  variable  for current  consump- 
tion. In either  case, an initial  overshoot  of demand  leads automatically  to 
an upward  adjustment  of predictions. 
Even  if an initial  deviation  in the strength  of demand  was only a transi- 
tory "blip,"  the multiplier-accelerator  process  would produce  persistent 
deviations  from the initially  expected  path. An upward  deviation  would 
generate  extra  income  and output  that would, in turn,  increase  aggregate 
demand  in subsequent  periods.  A higher  GNP means  a higher  disposable 
income,  and  hence  adds  to next  period's  consumption;  extra  final  demands 
also add  to next  period's  demand  for inventory  and  fixed  investment. 
This  multiplier-accelerator  process  is the reason  for the lagged  impact  of 
fiscal  actions  on GNP as well as the persisting  impact  of deviations  in pri- 
vate demand.  The time  periods  of the two dynamic  processes  are  bound  to 
be essentially  the same. The dynamic  multiplier  on fiscally  generated  dis- 
posable  income and that on privately  generated  income to the same re- 
cipients  will have  the same  time  profile.  Recognition  of this dual  nature  of 
lags  changes  the basic  view of the dynamics  of stabilization  policy.  Lags in 
the effects of fiscal-monetary  tools are often cursed for hampering  the 
effectiveness  of policy. But these  are  the same  lags that apply  to the effects 
of shifts  in private  demand  and generate  the cumulative  character  of eco- 
nomic fluctuations.  From that point of view, the lags are blessings  that 
permit  the  policy  maker  to take  the  stitch  in time. 
Thus the evidence  of both Keynesian  and monetarist  models of eco- 
nomic activity  suggests  that we live in an economy  of persistence,  rather 
than  self-correction.40  If GNP moves  either  above  or below  its target  path, 
it tends  to stay on that side of the path long enough  to permit  corrective 
assistance  from  prompt  policy action. 
40. In addition  to self-correction  and persistence,  "cyclical  overcorrection"  is a third 
possible  pattern  of economic movement.  If the economy has a sufficiently  strong  and re- 
liable accelerator,  a current  shortfall  below  the expected  path  could actually  increase  the 
expected level of economic activity in some specified future period, given fiscal and 
monetary policy. The paradoxes  that arise under such circumstances  have been ex- 
plored by William  J. Baumol, "Pitfalls  in Contracyclical  Policies: Some Tools and Re- 
sults," Review of Econiomics anid  Statistics,  Vol. 43 (1961), pp. 21-26.  So far as I can see, 
deterministic  cyclical overcorrection  is not of great  empirical  importance. 148  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Responses  to Demand  Deviations 
FISCAL NEUTRALIZATION 
The persistence  of deviations  in private demand and the multiplier- 
accelerator  effects  open up the important  possibility  that some shifting  of 
fiscal  instruments  will  reduce  uncertainty  about  economic  activity  as well  as 
improve  the expected  outcome. 
To appreciate  the way activism  may reduce  risk, consider  an initially 
blissful  situation  in which  expected  GNP (YP)  is equal  to Y* at the mini- 
mum  uncertainty  settings  of the instruments,  which  happen  to be precisely 
the settings  espoused  by rule proponents.  Then the activist  and the rules 
proponent  have  no disagreement,  and no sacrifice  is needed  to hold down 
multiplier  uncertainty.  Suppose  further  that,  in this world,  business  invest- 
ment outlays  and government  purchases  have an identical-although not 
reliably  known-dynamic multiplier  effect  on Y. Finally, suppose  that a 
survey  of business  investment  plans  provides  an excellent  forecast  of that 
component  for at least one quarter  in advance. 
On these assumptions,  any downward  surprise  in business  investment 
plans  should  be offset  dollar  for dollar  by an increase  in government  pur- 
chases  over  and above  the path  called  for by fiscal  rules.  Given  reliable  in- 
formation  that investment  is below  the initial  forecast,  inaction  would  not 
only leave YP  below Y*  but would  also permit  increased  multiplier  uncer- 
tainty  on the impact  of the shortfall  in investment.  Because  the same un- 
known  multiplier  will go to work  in an upward  direction  on the additional 
government  purchases  and in a downward  direction  on the shortfall  in 
business  investment,  it is possible, in this case, to hedge perfectly  and 
neutralize  the surprise  in private  demand. 
Obviously,  these  assumptions  are extreme;  but the point remains  quali- 
tatively  valid even if the multipliers  are not identical,  if the forecast of 
private  spending  is not perfect,  and if the government  action cannot be 
perfectly  synchronized  in time.  For one  example  of an  imperfect  offset,  sup- 
pose  that  tax  cuts  are  the only  available  fiscal  instrument.  If, as a result  of a 
shortfall  of private  investment  equal  to S, private  disposable  income  would 
be cut by, say, O.6S,  a general  tax cut of 0.6S would  eliminate  the income 
effects  of the shortfall.  The  initial  drop  in output  could  have  continuing  ac- 
celerator  effects,  but that part of the multiplier  process stemming  from 
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with inaction,  the outcome  would mean a smaller  expected  gap and less 
variance  around  the expected  GNP. 
In the partial  neutralization  provided  by such a tax cut, discretionary 
policy  reinforces  the automatic  fiscal  stabilizers.  Automatic  changes  in tax 
revenues  and  transfer  benefits  offset  0.4 of the potential  income  loss; a cut 
in taxes that neutralizes  the remaining  0.6 ratio per dollar deviation  in 
GNP brings  the expected  net impact  on private  disposable  income  down  to 
zero,  just as  though  the automatic  stabilizers  provided  a full offset.4' 
From the point of view of stabilization  policy,  it could be highly  desir- 
able for automatic  stabilizers  to provide  the entire  offset  to the private  in- 
come  loss (or gain)  stemming  from  an initial  deviation  in demand.  But  they 
cannot  be designed  to approach  that magnitude  for nonstabilization  rea- 
sons: Neither marginal  tax rates nor income replacement  ratios under 
transfer  programs  are  ever  near  100  percent,  because  such  rates  would  have 
extremely  adverse  effects  on incentives. 
If the policy maker  can respond  to surprises  in demand  only after  they 
have  occurred,  he still  has  considerable  opportunity  to hedge  as well  as im- 
prove  the expected  outcome.  Suppose  the shortfall  in private  investment 
takes place without a policy offset, and makes Yo =  Y-  uo. Then, with 
the initially intended policy, Yi will be below Y1 by an amount (kluo -  111), 
where  the expected  value  of ul equals  zero. If the policy  maker  can take a 
stimulative  action  AP  with  a first  period  multiplier  k', ki.\P gets subtracted 
from the expression above, leaving a shortfall of (kluo -  ul -  kAP).  If 
k1 and k' are random variables subject to errors vi and v', respectively, the 
expected  squared  deviation  of Yi from Yp will be E(viuo -  ul -  vAP)2. 
So long as vl is positively  correlated  with v1 and not positively  correlated 
with  ul, that  is sufficient  to ensure  that  some  amount  of stimulus  will  reduce 
variance  as well as cut the expected  gap. 
The income neutralization  argument  conveys a weak, but nonetheless 
revealing,  message  to the fiscal  policy maker:  If you can apply a prompt 
and  temporary  policy  that  would  offset  some  of the probable  consequences 
of initial deviations  in demand,  you can simultaneously  improve  the ex- 
pected  outcome  and  reduce  uncertainty  about  the path  of income.  For the 
41. These issues  are related  to A. W. Phillips'  important  discussion  and classification 
of stabilization strategies in "Stabilisation  Policy in a Closed Economy," Economic 
Journal,  Vol. 64 (June 1954),  pp. 290-323. As Phillips  makes  clear,  the elimination  of the 
induced income change, or any type of full proportionate  correction, provides only 
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uncertain  multiplier  pattern  associated  with  that policy  will work  to offset, 
at least  in part,  the similarly  uncertain  multiplier  effects  of the initial  devia- 
tion in demand.42 
IMPLICATIONS  OF MONETARISM 
The most ardent  and articulate  exponents  of monetary  rules-led  by 
Milton Friedman-are also "monetarists,"  believing  that changes  in the 
money  supply  are  the key force  determining  changes  in nominal  GNP. Al- 
though the personalities  advocating  them may be identical,  the proposi- 
tions are  distinct.43  As David Fand  has pointed  out, a monetarist  tradition 
that prevailed  in the 1920s  was quite activist  in its thrust.44  As should  be 
clear  from the discussion  above  concerning  persistence  versus  self-correc- 
tion in the income velocity of money, a monetarist  who believes that 
velocity surprises  persist would wish to deviate from a path of steady 
monetary  growth  when Y departs  from Y*. 
I should  like  to illustrate  the activist  implications  of one monetarist  view 
by reference  to econometric  studies  of money-income  relations  made  by the 
St. Louis  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  focusing  on them because  they represent 
the  most  thorough  and  carefully  articulated  quantification  of the  monetarist 
view.45  According  to the St. Louis  model,  price  flexibility  works  very  slowly 
to restore  equilibrium,  with a process  of adjustment  that lasts for many 
years.  On the other  hand,  the dynamic  multiplier  effect  of money  on nomi- 
nal GNP is estimated  to be complete  over  a period  of four  quarters.  More- 
over, the standard  errors  on the estimated  multiplier  coefficients  are con- 
sistently  fairly  small. Finally,  as noted above, the GNP equation  implies 
that any observed  deviation  of the income  velocity  of money  from its ex- 
pected  level  should  be viewed  as permanent. 
42. The same argument  reveals that responding  to deviations in fiscal instruments 
need not add significantly  to multiplier  uncertainty;  if, for example,  a rejected  tax hike is 
replaced  by a proposed  transfer  cut, the multiplier  pattern  can be counted on to be simi- 
lar. But this sauce for the instrument-surprise  goose is also sauce for the demand- 
surprise  gander. 
43. That point is made in some detail by Paul A. Samuelson,  in "Reflections  on the 
Merits  and Demerits  of Monetarism,"  in Diamond (ed.), Issues in Fiscal and Monetary 
Policy, pp. 7-12. 
44. David  I.  Fand, "Monetarism and  Fiscalism," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly  Review,  No. 94 (Rome: September  1970),  pp. 298-99. 
45. The Laffer-Ranson  model, with no lagged effects, gives a clear mandate  for ac- 
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In the appendix,  employing  several  simplifying  assumptions  (which  favor 
inaction,  if anything),  I derive  some policy implications  of the St. Louis 
model. The exercise  shows  how a policy maker  who has a quadratic  loss 
function,  and who believes  my simplified  version  of the St. Louis model, 
should respond  to deviations  in GNP. The results  demonstrate  that he 
should  not keep  monetary  growth  steady,  but rather  should  step  it up when 
GNP falls  below  the  target  path  and  reduce  it when  GNP exceeds  the  target. 
This  finding  also  illustrates  a general  principle:  Any  claim  of reliable  knowl- 
edge  about  the effect  of a policy  instrument  on economic  activity  is likely  to 
imply some prescription  for the use of that instrument.  For all but the 
most strained  assumptions,  anyone who believes that a dollar of extra 
money  reliably  produces,  say,  five  dollars  of extra  GNP is obliged  to favor 
the  creation  of additional  money  when  more  GNP is desired. 
The approximate  optimization  of the St. Louis model suggests that 
monetary  policy  should  create  a negative feedback  of the recent  strength  of 
GNP (relative  to target)  on the money  supply  rather  than  the independence 
sought  by the rule.  It is, however,  often  contended  that actual  Federal  Re- 
serve  policy  tends  to produce  positive feedback  by accommodating,  at least 
in part, changes in the demand  for money stemming  from changes in 
economic  activity. 
It is obviously  beyond  the scope  of this paper  to determine  the nature  of 
the feedback  in past or current  Federal  Reserve  policy. Supporting  the 
charge  of positive  feedback  is circumstantial  evidence  that the growth  of 
money has been especially  slow during  recession  periods. On the other 
hand,  it has been particularly  rapid  during  the initial  phase  of cyclical  ex- 
pansions,  when  the desired  growth  of real GNP was presumably  large.  In 
any case, the analytical  conclusion  that a monetary  policy that produced 
positive  feedback  from  (Y -  Y*)  onto M might  be on the "wrong  side"  of 
the rule  is not solely  monetarist.  On a Keynesian  view  of the causal  process 
running  from M to Y, a monetary  policy that accommodates  increases  in 
the demand  for money  stemming  from  shifts  in liquidity  preference  helps  to 
stabilize  income  and interest  rates.  On the other  hand,  if it accommodates 
increases  in the demand  for money stemming  from higher  levels of eco- 
nomic activity  (and consequently  increased  transactions  requirements),  it 
thereby  weakens  the automatically  stabilizing  impact  of higher  economic 
activity  in raising  interest  rates.46  Hence,  a positive  feedback  from  ( Y -  Y*) 
46. These distinctions  are spelled  out in Poole, "Optimal  Choice of Monetary  Policy 
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onto M would  give  presumptive  evidence  of a defect  in monetary  policy;47 
while  a positive  feedback  from  shifts  in liquidity  preference  onto M would 
be a sign of effectiveness. 
Any evaluative  comparison  of a policy that varies  money growth  with 
one of fixed money growth  should take both types of feedback  into ac- 
count.  It should  also  recognize  the  impacts  on nonstabilization  targets  asso- 
ciated  with  variability  of interest  rates  and  endeavor  to explain  why  central 
banks  in fact  place  a heavy  weight  on the stability  of financial  markets  and 
interest  rates.  As noted above,  there  are many  important-and rarely  dis- 
cussed-issues in this area:  What  weight  should  society  place on the sta- 
bility of (nominal  and real)  interest  rates?  Will constraints  on very short- 
run variations  of rates tend to produce  larger  swings in the long run? 
Answers  to these  questions  should  be part  of any full assessment  of mone- 
tary  strategy. 
BREAKING  RULES FOR LARGE DEVIATIONS 
Some proponents  of fixed fiscal-monetary  settings  have recommended 
departure  from  their  rules  in the event  of a sufficiently  large  (or sufficiently 
persistent)  deviation  in aggregate  demand.48  In effect,  a mixed  strategy  is 
proposed  that  generally  would  rely  on fixed  settings,  but  would  depart  from 
them  when  the economy  moved  outside  some  band  around  the target  path. 
None of the  proponents  of the  mixed  strategy  has  offered  much  analytical 
justification  for it. I can see a number  of conceivable  justifications,  but no 
persuasive  ones.  In the  case  of fiscal  policy,  set-up  costs  would  argue  against 
shifts unless the potential stabilization  benefits  reached  some threshold 
magnitude.  But this issue is relevant  primarily  to shifts  within  a calendar 
year.  Altering  the  amount  of expenditure  stimulus  in the  annual  budget  pro- 
gram  imposes  no set-up  costs since  the formulation  of that program  is an 
overhead  cost. Nor do set-up  costs have  any  significant  relevance  to mone- 
tary  policy. 
47. However, this result  does not hold in a dynamic  process  involving  cyclical over- 
correction  rather  than persistence.  Michael  C. Lovell and Edward  Prescott  demonstrate 
that analytical  result in "Money, Multiplier  Accelerator  Interaction,  and the Business 
Cycle,"  Southern  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 35 (July  1968),  pp. 60-72. As noted above in the 
reference  to Baumol's article (note 40), I do not regard  the deterministic  cycle as an 
empirically  relevant  view of the economy. 
48. See, for example,  Committee  for Economic  Development,  Taxes  and the Budget. 
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A second  type of justification  might  distinguish  disturbances  that com- 
pelled  the policy  maker  to alter  his beliefs  about  the structure  of the econ- 
omy  from  disturbances  that  seemed  to be merely  random.  However,  struc- 
tural  changes  come  in many  sizes  and  are  accompanied  by varying  amounts 
of evidence  on their occurrence.  A band could not provide  a good basis 
for quality  control  on whether  to scrap  one's model of the economy.  Nor 
should  random  deviations  always  be ignored. 
Still a third  type of justification  might  be based  on the shape  of the loss 
function.  The policy  maker  may not have  strong  preferences  on the target 
for economic  activity-for example,  unemployment  rates  between  4.0 and 
5.0 percent  may seem  equally  acceptable,  or different  public  officials  may 
have  varying  preferences  among  them.  Under  some  assumptions  about  the 
distribution  of forecast  errors,  such  a set of preferences  could  justify  inac- 
tion in response  to small disturbances.  But such a preference  function  is 
likely  to reflect  an administration's  aversion  to headaches  rather  than the 
society's  true  indifference  among  widely  ranging  possible  levels  of GNP. 
Similarly,  an inappropriate  incentive  system might make the mixed 
strategy  optimal for the policy maker  when it was not optimal for the 
country.  A high  penalty  on officials  for  errors  of commission  and  a low one 
for errors  of omission  would  bias choices  toward  a mixed  strategy.  If, for 
example,  the policy maker  waits until GNP is far below target  (or below 
target  for a long time)  before  taking  stimulative  action,  he can be confident 
that his ultimate  action  is better  than  continued  inaction.  He will have re- 
duced  the chance  of being  penalized  for an error  of commission.  Of course, 
by the time he acts, the nation  would have paid heavily  for the error  of 
omission.  Moreover,  too late probably  means  too much:  The shift in the 
instruments  will probably  have to be large,  involving  considerable  multi- 
plier uncertainty  and substantial  disturbance  to private  decision  making. 
On many  counts,  a strategy  that  yields  large  and  infrequent  shifts  seems  in- 
ferior  to a more  continuous  policy  with small  and frequent  changes  in the 
settings. 
Actual  policy making  has resembled  the mixed  strategy  at times in the 
past  decade.  At the start  of the year  in 1962  and again  in 1971,  the private 
economy  was  given  a "last  chance"  to attain  strong  recovery  momentum  on 
its own, with  little  assistance  from  stimulative  policy.  Strikingly,  in August 
of both years,  when  the shortfall  persisted  and it became  clear  that nature 
was not taking  a curative  course,  President  Kennedy  and  President  Nixon, 
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offer  particularly  eloquent  testimony  in favor  of smaller  and prompter  ad- 
justments  of fiscal-monetary  instruments.49 
Rules  and  Political  Discipline 
After surveying  the various economic arguments  that might support 
fixed fiscal-monetary  settings,  I have become increasingly  convinced  that 
the rules  proponent  must  rest  his case on political  and essentially  noneco- 
nomic grounds.  And he does have a prima  facie case along those lines. 
Many of the major economic  fluctuations  in the past generation50-the 
1950-51  Korean  inflation,  the 1953-54  post-Korean  recession,  the 1960-61 
recession,  and the 1965-66  Vietnam  inflation-were directly  government- 
created  through  swings  in the budget,  with  accompanying  swings  in money 
growth, that departed  from any and all professional  prescriptions  for 
stabilization.  The planners  of economic  policy were  blocked  by political 
barriers  associated  with  military  decisions  in three  of these  cases,  and with 
attachment  to actual  budgetary  balance  in the fourth. 
A budgetary  rule  or procedure  that prevented  the government's  own fis- 
cal actions from destabilizing  the economy would have helped in these 
cases.  With  these  instances  averaged  in, a fixed,  moderate  full employment 
surplus-accompanied  by steady  money  growth-in peace and war, even 
years  and odd years,  quite  likely  would  have  yielded  better  results  on bal- 
ance  during  the past  generation  than  those obtained  from  the actual  fiscal- 
monetary  process. Moreover, a monetary  rule might have introduced 
discipline  against  the big fiscal  swings;  if monetary  policy  had not accom- 
modated  them  to a major  degree,  the disruptive  side  effects  of tight  money 
might  have  forced  a shift  away  from  a reckless  fiscal  course.  Just  as in other 
areas  of government  activity  constitutional  safeguards  may  be inefficient  on 
occasion  and would  clearly  be too inflexible  for a world  of completely  ra- 
tional and honest  men, a "constitutional"  limitation  on the flexibility  of 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy  might  conceivably  be desirable,  on balance,  even 
though  it is not economically  optimal. 
It would be a major step forward  in the professional  dialogue  if the 
49. See my detailed  comments  in "Political  Economy: Some Lessons of Recent Ex- 
perience."  In addition  to these instances,  the mixed strategy  has some limited  relevance 
to the errors  of 1965-66. 
50. See Paul W. McCracken,  "Economic  Policy and the Lessons of Experience,"  in 
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macroeconomic  and  the political  aspects  of the issues  were  carefully  distin- 
guished.  The historical  record  surely  demonstrates  that we need  better  po- 
litical procedures  to safeguard  economic stabilization  objectives,  but it 
does not reveal  whether  a set of rules would surmount  political  barriers 
any better  than  (or even as well as) an activist  strategy. 
The proponents  of rules  have not made  clear  how they are supposed  to 
operate  as constraints  on the political  process.  No one suggests  that fixed 
fiscal  and monetary  settings  could or should  be written  into the Constitu- 
tion, or even into statute,  with penalties  for violators.  Rather,  the Federal 
Reserve  is being  urged  to impose  on itself a constraint  that would  remove 
its subsequent  opportunity  to influence  the key decision  variables  under  its 
control. Similarly,  the President  and his agents are urged  to impose the 
same self-restraint  and self-denial  by obeying a fiscal rule. One reason 
people  impose  rules  on themselves  is that  they  do not trust  their  own  ration- 
ality.  But this reason  seems  particularly  inappropriate  in the case at hand: 
If the nation's  top public  officials  are  irrational  about  their  area  of profes- 
sional expertise,  then the nation needs  better officials  rather  than a con- 
fession  of irrationality  by the existing  ones.51 
In general,  people also may impose rules on themselves  to strengthen 
their  bargaining  positions  against  possible  adversaries  by delimiting  their 
own options. The rules proposal may contain some elements of this 
strategy.  Perhaps  the Federal  Reserve  is being asked  to announce  unmis- 
takably  to the President  and to the Congress  that it will not help  finance  a 
reckless  fiscal  policy. Perhaps  administration  economic  officials  are being 
asked  to draw  a line  that  the  Congress  (and  even  the  President)  cannot  cross. 
In another  sense,  the economics  profession  and  other  informed  observers 
of the economy  are being  asked  to form  a consensus  in favor  of rules  that 
would impose discipline  on federal  policy making. If economists  have 
power  to persuade  and mobilize  public  opinion,  then they should  use it to 
promote rational  and timely policy adjustments  instead of nonoptimal 
rules.  Like  the mice,  we all wish  to bell the cat; but is the promulgation  of 
nondiscretionary  rules  really  the way  to put a resounding  bell on him? 
51. I find it puzzling  and amusing  that economists  who rely most heavily  on the ra- 
tionality of consumers,  workers,  and businesses  (for example, in denying the need for 
statutory  information  and safety  requirements)  attribute  the most unsophisticated  irra- 
tionality and myopia to federal  policy makers.  A related puzzle: Why are government 
decision makers  often urged  to "satisfice"-that is, aim for a satisfactory  outcome and 
avoid perfectionist  ambitions-by  economists who insist that private  decision makers 
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A general  search  for safeguards  uncovers  many  possible  alternatives  to 
rules. One small forward  step might be an agreement  by the executive 
branch,  the  Federal  Reserve,  and  the  Congress  on a regular  annual  dialogue 
focusing  on a set of fiscal  and  monetary  indicators  that  would  describe  the 
stance  of stabilization  policy.  Such  a discussion  might  help  to highlight  the 
relevant  issue: What deviations  of those indicators  from their historical 
average  positions  are  appropriate  in light  of the  state  of private  demand  and 
the target  for prospective  economic  activity? 
The indicatots  of fiscal  and monetary  settings  would serve  as guides  in 
judging  the appropriateness  of policy.  As Warren  Smith  pointed  out, indi- 
cators  are  only  a way  to characterize  policy,  and  the basic  need  is to formu- 
late and carry  it out properly  rather  than merely  to characterize  it prop- 
erly.52  Nevertheless,  I believe  that accepted  indicators  can serve  a useful 
function  in providing  a context in which to evaluate-defend and criti- 
cize-a  set of policy  choices. 
I have previously  suggested,  as a political  safeguard,  the creation  of a 
bipartisan  board of economic  experts,  separate  from the administration, 
and authorized  to speak  out on policy  issues  involving  technical  results  or 
widespread  professional  agreement.53  A body with some official  designa- 
tion could have more authority  and impact  whenever  it could muster  an 
overwhelming  agreement  than does the troupe of unorganized,  however 
distinguished,  members  of the profession  who testify  individually  to con- 
gressional  committees.  I have no illusions  about the range  and frequency 
with  which  bipartisan  agreement  would  be obtained  within  the profession. 
But I believe  that the majority  of disinterested  private  economists,  repre- 
senting  a wide range  of methodology  and ideology,  would have been ap- 
propriately  critical  of administration  policies  and programs  both in early 
1966  and  early  1971.  Moreover,  the very  existence  of such  a board  in those 
periods  might  have  exerted  a disciplinary  influence  on the internal  discus- 
sions  and  debates  that  led to the inappropriate  fiscal  programs. 
Even more important,  reforms  of legislative  procedures  could help to 
ensure  greater  responsiveness  of fiscal  policy  to the right  signals  and  greater 
insulation  from the wrong  pressures.  Such reforms  would include  estab- 
lishing  a reliable  mechanism  for prompt  congressional  verdicts  on presi- 
52. See Warren  L. Smith, "A Neo-Keynesian  View of Monetary  Policy,"  in Control- 
ling Monetary  Aggregates,  Proceedings  of the Monetary  Conference,  Nantucket  Island, 
June 8-10, 1969 (Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston, 1969), p. 119. 
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dential  tax proposals;  extending  the scope of formula  flexibility  recently 
initiated  in extended  unemployment  insurance  benefits  and the public  ser- 
vice  jobs program  (some important  experiments  in rules  with feedback); 
and creating  more opportunities  for reliance  on temporary,  self-limiting, 
and  self-terminating  provisions.54 
In summary,  the best strategy  for stabilization  policy, and for political 
procedures  to safeguard  stabilization  objectives,  remains  a major  challenge 
that  takes  us beyond  our  present  knowledge.  But  rules  for fixed  instrument 
settings  would not achieve  our objectives.  On the contrary,  it would  be a 
rare  coincidence  for the same  full employment  surplus  or the same  rate  of 
monetary  growth  (or the same interest  rates)  to be appropriate  two years 
in a row.  The proponents  of rules  have  raised  important  issues;  they have 
provided  good questions  and bad answers.  In this paper,  I have tried  to 
highlight  and  interpret  their  good questions  and to sort out the issues  they 
raise  in both the economic  and political  areas,  in an effort  to facilitate  the 
search  for the good answers. 
APPENDIX 
Responses  to Demand  Deviations 
with  the St. Louis Model 
Assumptions 
1. The policy maker  believes  the St. Louis model, and he controls  the 
money  stock  exactly. 
2. His  loss function  is quadratic  and  symmetrical,  and  his horizon  is four 
quarters  long with no discounting.  Thus 
4 
E(L)-  =  E(Yi-  yt)2 
54. The importance  of temporary  measures  is developed  by Frank  W. Schiff, "Con- 
trol of Inflation  and Recession,"  Annals  of thle  American  Academy  of Political  and  Social 
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where 
E  expected  value operator 
L  loss 
Yi  GNP in the ith quarter 
Yi  target  GNP in the ith quarter. 
3. He always  plans a money  path over  the next four quarters.  He does 
not use  federal  expenditures  as a policy  tool, but  he knows  them  in advance. 
4. Initially,  the target  path of GNP calls for increments  of money  (M) 
that happen  to coincide  with  minimum  variance,  thus  equaling  the average 
increment  of M in the sample  period.  Hence,  the standard  error  of forecast 
one quarter  ahead is simply  the standard  error  of estimate  of the GNP 
equation-$3.84 billion,  as shown  in Table  A-1. 
Table  A-1. Total  Spending  Equation  of the  St. Louis  Model,  1953:1-1969  4a 
4  4 
A  Yt =  2.67 +  I  miAMt-  +  Ee,AEt- 
(3.46)  i-O  i=O 
A2 -  0.66; standard  error  of estimate =  3.84; Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.75 
Variable  Coefficientb  Variable  Coefficient 
mO  1.22  (0.45)  eo  0.56 
mI  1.80  (0.25)  e1  0.45 
m2  1.62  (0.38)  e2  0.01 
m3  0.87  (0.24)  e3  -0.43 
m4  0.06  (0.50)  e4  -0.54 
Emi  5.57  (0.69)  ,e,  0.05 
Source: Federal Reserve  Bank of St. Louis Review,  Vol. 52 (April 1970), p. 11. 
a.  The symbols used in this table are defined as follows: 
A Yt = dollar change in total spending (GNP in current prices) in quarter t. 
AMi-=  dollar change in money stock in quarter t -  i. 
t-=  dollar change in high employment federal expenditures in quarter t -  i. 
b,  The numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors of the estimated coefficients. 
5. Since  the equation  generates  only  a slight  positive  serial  correlation  of 
residuals  (the  Durbin-Watson  statistic  is 1.75),  the  policy  maker  treats  them 
as uncorrelated.  Thus, the standard  error  of forecast  of the level of  Y n 
quarters  in the future  (that  is, of n changes  in Y) is 3.84 (xfi). 
6. Given  assumptions  2, 4, and 5, expected  loss can be expressed  as 
E(L) =  (3.84)2 (1 +  2 +  3 +  4)  =  147.50. 
7. In deciding  on adjustments  in his intended  money path, the policy 
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(mO  .  .  m4) is zero.1  Also, he views the m and e coefficients  on federal 
expenditures  as uncorrelated. 
Exercise 
After charting  his course for a year ahead, the policy maker  waits a 
quarter,  observes  GNP for  that  quarter  zero,  and  thenlooks  ahead  four  more 
quarters.  Suppose  that,  in quarter  zero,  the price  equation  worked  with  no 
error, but GNP deviated  from its expected and target value by some 
amount,  u. 
Just  to illustrate,  suppose  Yo  was below Yo  by $5 billion;  u =-5.  (All 
the instrument  calculations  that follow are  proportional  to u and all incre- 
mental  loss calculations  are  proportional  to u2.  The  choice  of this  particular 
illustration  does not influence  the nature  of the results;  a u of +5  would 
simply  reverse  the direction,  while  the absolutely  smaller  negative  u of -2.5 
would cut the instrument  moves in half and the incremental  losses by 
three-fourths.) 
The  policy  maker  is about  to rechart  his  course  for  the next  four  quarters. 
The target  path is unaltered,  and the expected  changes  in Y for a given 
money  path  are  unaltered,  but  the expected  level  of Y is lower  by $5 billion 
for each  subsequent  quarter,  assuming  that  M is kept  on its initially  planned 
path. 
With  no response  in altering  M, the expected  loss for the subsequent  four 
quarters  is 
E(L) =4  (5)2  +  147.50 =  247.50. 
The incremental  loss associated  with the deviation  in quarter  zero is 100 
(see Tables  A-2 and A-3 and Figure  A-1). 
With  expectedfull  adjustment,  the policy  maker  acts  as though  he were  in 
the activist's  paradise,  resetting  M relative  to its intended  path to make Y 
equal  to Y*  for each  subsequent  quarter.  This  is better  than  no response;  it 
cuts  the incremental  loss to 59.23.  The  full 100  of loss from  expected  devia- 
tions is saved,  but the policy maker  pays heavily  for the added  Brainard- 
type variance  created  by the large  swings  in M from  its initial  path, which 
was assumed  to minimize  variance. 
1. In fact, the prevailing  covariance  is negative;  the square  of the standard  error of 
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Table  A-2. Money  and  GNP  Paths  over  Four  Quarters  Following  a 
$5 Billion  Deviation  in GNP, under  Alternative  Stabilization  Strategies 
Billions of dollars 
Quarter 
Stabilization  strategy  and 
money  supply  or GNP item  I  11  lll  IV 
No response 
AM  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
y-  Y*  -5.00  -5.00  -5.00  -5.00 
Expected  full adjustment 
AM  4.10  -6.05  3.48  -0.02 
Y-  Y*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
"Horizon"  adjustment 
AM  0.91  0.00  0.00  0.00 
y -  *  -3.89  -2.25  -0.78  0.00 
Optimal  adjustment 
AM  1.87  -0.78  -0.74  0.42 
y-  Y*  -2.72  -0.31  0.41  -0.04 
Source: Derived by author. See discussion in text. 
Another  option for the policy maker  is adjustment  back to the target 
path  over  the four-quarter  horizon.  He would  then  add  enough  M in quar- 
ter one to raise Y in quarter  four by an expected  $5 billion;  he would  plan 
to maintain  the previously  intended  M growth  in quarters  two, three,  and 
four.  This  strategy  leaves  expected  Y  below  target  in quarters  one,  two, and 
three;  but very  little  extra  variance  is incurred  by multiplier  uncertainty  on 
the instrument  adjustment.  The incremental  loss is cut to 21.90. (See 
horizon  adjustment  in tables and figure.) 
Table  A-3. Loss over  Four  Quarters  Following  a $5 Billion Deviation  in 
GNP, under  Alternative  Stabilization  Strategies 
Billions of dollars 
Utility  Incremental 
Stabilization  strategy  loss  loss 
Expected  loss with no deviation  147.50  ... 
No response  247.50  100.00 
Expected  full adjustment  206.73  59.23 
"Horizon"  adjustment  169.40  21.90 
Optimal  adjustment  160.59  13.09 
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Figure A-1.  GNP  Paths  over Four Quarters Following  a $5 Billion 
Deviation,  under Alternative  Stabilization  Strategies 
Y -  Y*) Billions of dollars 
Expected full adjustmet:t.... 
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Quarters 
Source:  Table  A-2. 
Note:  Y is  gross  national  product;  Y* is target  GNP. 
Finally,  the  policy  maker  can  solve  for  and  apply  the  optimal  adjustment. 
The  solution  sets  forth  E(L)  as  a  function  of  unspecified  amounts  of  AM1, 
AM2, AM3,  AM4;  it then  minimizes  by  differentiating  partially  with  respect 
to  each  and  setting  each  derivative  equal  to  zero.  The  resulting  system  of 
four  linear  equations  in  four  unknowns  yields  the  entries  shown  in  the 
tables  and  figure. 
The  optimal  adjustment  is  much  less  activist  than  expected  full  adjust- 
ment,  but  more  so  than  the  horizon  adjustment.  It cuts  the  incremental  loss 
to  13.09;  about  half  of  that  loss  stems  from  expected  deviations  in  Y from 
Y*  and  about  half  from  multiplier  uncertainty  on  the  incremental  money. 162  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1972 
In my  judgment,  the simplifying  assumptions  specified  at the outset  lean 
over  backwards,  on balance,  in favor  of inaction.  First, ignoring  the small 
amount of positive  serial  correlation  of residuals  makes the no-response 
pattern  look somewhat  better;  it does not penalize  inaction  for the proba- 
bility  that  a downward  deviation  in A Y in one quarter  will  be followed  by a 
downward  deviation  in A  Y in the subsequent  quarter.  Second,  ignoring  the 
negative  covariance  among  the money  multipliers  makes  a small  shift  (like 
horizon  adjustment)  seem  more  risky  than  it really  is; on the other  hand,  it 
underestimates  the variance  associated  with  policy  strategies  (like  expected 
full adjustment)  that adjust M in opposite directions  during successive 
quarters.  Third,  omitting  any possibility  of using  federal  expenditures  as a 
policy  tool cuts down the optimal  activism.  Most important,  ignoring  the 
opportunity  to shift  the money  path  subsequently  in light  of any  deviations 
in Y observed  in quarters  one, two, and three  overstates  the expected  loss 
for any activist  strategy.  Finally,  cutting  off the horizon  after  four  quarters 
underestimates  the cost of inaction;  it could  also understate  the cost of in- 
strument  changes  if a major overhang  of added  (or reduced)  money re- 
mained  at the end  of the four  quarters,  requiring  a neutralizing  action  in the 
fifth  quarter;  but  none  of the  activist  strategies  leaves  a significant  overhang. 
To be sure,  the choice of nominal  GNP as the unchanging  target  has a 
slight  tendency  to overstate  the cost of inaction.  It would  be more  realistic 
to take an unchanged  target  path of real GNP. But since price  flexibility 
works  very  slowly  in the price  equations  of the St. Louis  model,  the simpli- 
fication  has only a minor  distorting  effect.  Inaction  would  leave expected 
real  GNP at the end  of four  quarters  down  by about  $4.8  billion  of the total 
$5 billion drop in expected  nominal  GNP. In addition,  the calculations 
above are true to the spirit  of St. Louis by ignoring  social costs of insta- 
bility  in interest  rates. 
Horizon  adjustment  is obviously  an overly  conservative  policy  strategy; 
it avoids  any  expected  reversal  of policy  or "oversteering."  Yet it does  come 
reasonably  close to optimality  in the exercise.  The result  suggests  that, if a 
St. Louis  man  wants  to live by a simple  rule,  he can improve  substantially 
on the rule of steady  money growth  by adopting  the following  feedback 
rule:  Always  deviate  from  a steady  growth  money  path  by creating  enough 
additional  money  in this quarter  to make up ultimately  for last quarter's 
deviation  between  the actual  and  desired  growth  of GNP. 
Or he can frame  the rule  in terms  of growth  rates.  According  to horizon Arthur  M. Okun  163 
adjustment,  the initially  intended  growth  rate of money for this quarter 
should  be adjusted  by adding  it to any shortfall  (or subtracting  from  it any 
overshoot)  in last quarter's  GNP below  (or above)  its desired  rate. Thus  if 
the annual  growth  of GNP last quarter  was, in fact, 5 percent  when the 
target  growth  was 8 percent,  the annual  rate  of money  growth  for the cur- 
rent  quarter  should  be marked  up by 3 percent  from  the  previously  intended 
rate. Comments  and 
Discussion 
David I. Fand: Arthur  Okun's "Fiscal-Monetary  Activism: Some Ana- 
lytical Issues"  probes and clarifies  some of the analytical  differences  be- 
tween  those who favor an activist  macroeconomic  policy and those who 
favor  rules  or guidelines. 
Several  dimensions  of the activism-guidelines  discussion  in the past  four 
decades  are  reviewed  in this paper.  The first  is the rules  versus  authorities 
issue,  which  was  first  raised  by Henry  Simons  during  the  depths  of the Great 
Depression  in the 1930s  and which  focuses  on the relative  merits  of auto- 
matic  and  discretionary  policies.  The second  concerns  the independence  of 
the central  bank  and the relative  powers  of the monetary  and  the political 
authorities-an aspect  of the activism  issue  that emerged  from  the studies 
of the Joint Economic  Committee  in the late 1950s  and early 1960s.  The 
third  is the fine-tuning  issue  that  emerged  in the 1960s  and  that  centered  on 
the reliability  of the forecasts  derived  from the large-scale  econometric 
models. Fourth and finally, there is the issue surrounding  the decision 
theory  approach  to optimal  policy,  which  has  been  receiving  increasing  at- 
tention  in the last  decade.  Okun's  analysis  of these  aspects  is perceptive  and 
his stimulating  discussion  directs  attention  to the important  issues. 
Okun argues  persuasively  that the discussion  of activism  versus  guide- 
lines (or rules)  centers  on the strategy  and tactics of stabilization  policy, 
while  the discussion  of monetarism  versus  fiscalism  focuses  on the content 
of stabilization  policy. The fact that activist  fiscalism  was challenged  by 
guideline  monetarism  in the 1960s  was, in my opinion,  something  of a his- 
torical  happenstance.  The  heyday  of monetary  fine  tuning  was  in the 1920s, 
and the stabilization  dialogue  in the last decade  was, in effect, between 
middle-aged  monetarism  and  youthful  fiscalism.  Ultimately  the implemen- 
tation strategies  associated  with monetarism  and fiscalism  will, I believe, 
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tend  to converge  more  and more,  so that a monetarist-fiscalist  substantive 
dichotomy  will coincide  less and less with an activist-guideline  tactical 
dichotomy. 
Okun  develops  the arguments  in favor of activism,  and his thoughtful 
analysis  will find acceptance  by many who do not share  his policy views. 
The emphasis  and language  in his paper  inevitably  reflect  his partiality  to 
activism.  Those who favor a guideline  approach  would presumably  em- 
phasize  different  matters.  To illustrate,  consider  Okun's  section on "The 
Issue of Self-correction."  Advocates  of rules  or guidelines  would empha- 
size the relative  stability  of private  demand  rather  than the self-correcting 
feature  of the system.  They assume  that the private  economy  is reasonably 
stable, and would remain  so in the absence  of severe  policy shocks.  An- 
other example  is the term "activist's  paradise";  a proponent  of rules or 
guidelines  would  probably  stress  the need  to avoid  purgatory. 
Guidelines  should  be defended  not on the grounds  that  they  incorporate 
all the necessary  knowledge,  but  rather  that  they  will,  in our  current  state  of 
knowledge  (or ignorance),  give us a reasonably  good result  on the average. 
Rules  or guidelines  are  therefore  to be thought  of as a temporary  solution, 
since  the possibility  always  exists  that someone  may  find  a better  one. Ac- 
tivism,  on the other  hand,  suggests  a license  to innovate,  depending  on the 
circumstances.  Guidelines  are  therefore  a conservative  strategy,  relying  on 
relatively  well-defined  procedures,  while  activism  is more  open-ended,  rely- 
ing on the  policy  maker's  ability  to develop  effective  measures  for  particular 
disturbances. 
Rules  or guidelines  are  rationalized  on the grounds  that  the best is often 
the enemy  of the good: Rules  are  not viewed  as a means  to achieve  the best 
result,  but rather  as a procedure  that will give a reasonably  good result  on 
the average.  This view is related  to Okun's  analogy  of guidelines  with a 
"constitutional"  limitation  on the flexibility  of fiscal  and monetary  policy. 
The stability  or instability  of the private  economy  is an important  issue 
separating  those who favor guidelines  from those who favor activism. 
Guideline  supporters  assume  that the need for policy to stabilize  the gov- 
ernment  may be greater  than the need for government  to stabilize  private 
demand.  They do not deny that private  demand  may at times fluctuate. 
What  they  fear  is that  activism  in pursuit  of the best outcome  may  produce 
inferior  results.  There  may  be a genuine  difference  here  in the  interpretation 
of history  between  those  who  favor  guidelines  and  those  who  favor  activism. 
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and  follows  the distinction  between  the best and  the  good. Those  who favor 
guidelines  may be willing  to settle for a system  that will give a relatively 
good result  on the average  because  they have somewhat  lower  aspirations 
than those who favor activism.  Alternatively,  some may choose activism 
precisely  because  they have  higher  aspirations;  they aim for a result  that is 
considered  outside  the attainable  range  by those who favor  rules. 
The idea that the private  economy  is reasonably  stable and the accep- 
tance  of lower  aspirations  appear  to be characteristic  of those who support 
guidelines.  Yet one may ask why, if the private  economy is reasonably 
stable,  should  a guideline  orientation  necessarily  be associated  with lower 
aspirations?  To explain  this apparent  paradox  it may be useful  to distin- 
guish  three  kinds  of macroeconomic  problems:  those that result  from  bad 
aggregate  demand  policy,  those  that  are  frictional  in nature,  and  those  that 
reflect  chronic  tendencies.  Unemployment  or  inflation  due  to bad  monetary- 
fiscal  policy  is an example  of the first  case; unemployment  or inflation  due 
to rapid  changes  in demand,  in technology,  and in resource  allocation- 
such as Charles  Schultze's  sectoral  inflation  case-represent the frictional 
problem;  and a tendency  for money  wages  to rise  faster  than  productivity, 
characterized  by high  rates  of unemployment  and  inflation  such  as we now 
associate  with a sloping  Phillips  curve,  may be an example  of the.  chronic 
problem.  Those who favor rules or guidelines  believe  they will achieve  a 
better  result  with  respect  to the first  problem,  but are  pessimistic  and  there- 
fore willing to accept imperfect  results for the second two cases. They 
believe  that  an activist  policy  will  not help  the Phillips  curve  problem  in the 
long  run  and  may  not help  very  much  with  respect  to the  frictional  problem. 
One  final  point: A factor  often  cited  in support  of rules  or guidelines- 
indeed,  sometimes  viewed  as one of the strongest  arguments-is their  hy- 
pothesized  effect on expectations.  Lloyd Mints, in discussing  alternative 
stabilization  policies,  would  rank  them on the extent  to which  they would 
tend  to stabilize  private  expectations.1  On this view,  a crucial  argument  for 
a guideline  policy is that it would  generate  such  stabilizing  expectations  in 
the private  economy. 
Okun's  excellent  paper focuses attention  on the activist-guideline  ap- 
proaches  to macroeconomic  policy.  His analysis  will motivate  and  help  the 
reader  to analyze  these  alternative  postures  and will stimulate  further  dis- 
cussion  of this  important  policy  issue.  The ensuing  dialogue  should  help  il- 
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luminate  one factor  responsible  for fundamental  differences  in stabilization 
policy. 
William  Brainard:  This  paper  serves  a very  useful  purpose  in clarifying  the 
various  analytical  considerations  involved  in debates  about stabilization 
strategy  and in illuminating  the relevance  to those debates  of lags, uncer- 
tainty,  and costs of adjustment.  Okun focuses  much of his discussion  on 
rules  versus  discretion.  The  relevant  question,  of course,  is, what  is optimal 
policy-not, if we had  to choose,  whether  we would  prefer  doing  nothing  to 
attempting  to stay continuously  on target by adjusting  our instruments 
second by second in response  to each new bit of information  about the 
economy. Okun does an excellent  job of identifying  and analyzing  the 
various  considerations  that tend to make optimal  policy, in a particular 
situation,  more or less activist.  The debate  about  how much discretion  is 
optimal  can never  be settled  in the abstract.  I found  it both surprising  and 
informative  to see how activist  optimal  policy turns out to be in the St. 
Louis model, even taking  into account  the lags in response  and the un- 
certainty  about the estimated  coefficients  in its regression  equations. I 
would  tend  to be more  conservative;  I would  want  to double  the estimated 
standard  errors  in anybody's  model, even my own. The spirit  of many  of 
Okun's  remarks  is less activist  than  the calculated  optimum  in the exercise 
shown  in his appendix. 
Some  critics  seem  to assume  that the only objective  of the Federal  Re- 
serve  is the stabilization  of GNP. They  see the Federal  Reserve  as behaving 
like the monkey  in the psychology  experiment  who always  gets the round 
pegs in the square  holes, even though  randomness  and ignorance  would 
lead to the correct  action half the time. I would  like to reinforce  Okun's 
insistence  that  the actual  historical  behavior  of the Federal  Reserve  should 
not be regarded  simply  as systematically  perverse.  If the Federal  Reserve 
appears  perverse,  it is not because  it takes  or rejects  the advice  of certain 
economists,  but because  it has a particular  perception  of the economy's 
workings  and because  it is concerned  with a variety  of objectives.  Many 
economists  felt that the Federal Reserve  was overly concerned  in 1966 
about  the health  of savings  and  loan associations  and of the homebuilding 
industry  at the expense  of the GNP target.  Okun  makes  an important  point 
in stressing  the need to be explicit about nonstabilization  objectives  in 
establishing  or evaluating  stabilization  policies. 
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of designing  new  instruments  or altering  existing  ones so that policy  could 
be more effective.  How can we design  instruments  with shorter  lags that 
would  make  us less dependent  on long-run  forecasts  of the economy?  How 
can we design  instruments  with  reliable  effects  and  with  low costs of adjust- 
ment?  A particularly  challenging  problem  is to design instruments  that 
provide  strong incentives  and yet avoid the adverse  anticipatory  effects 
that, as Okun  points out, can be associated  with enacting  and removing 
such  fiscal  devices  as the investment  tax credit.  One interesting  question  is 
whether  the Scandinavian  scheme  of storing  up pools of liquidity  during 
booms  and  activating  them  during  recessions  safeguards  against  such  effects. 
Okun  correctly  points  out that, so long as instruments  are not perfectly 
correlated,  it is optimal  to use a combination  of instruments,  or "policy 
packages,"  even  if we are  pursuing  a single  objective.  In any  reduced  form 
equation,  sample  estimates  of the response  coefficients  of fiscal  and mone- 
tary policies are likely to show a negative  correlation  of errors,  since the 
policies have most often been used in the same direction  to accomplish 
either  stimulus  or restraint.  Such  sample  correlations  warn  us that we can- 
not be sure  how to allocate  stimulative  or restrictive  effects  between  fiscal 
and monetary  policy, and it suggests  that anyone  who overestimates  the 
impact  of one tool is likely  to be underestimating  the impact  of the other. 
In this connection,  it would  have  been  interesting  if Okun  had  put govern- 
ment  expenditures  to work  in his calculations  on the St. Louis  model.  Even 
though  the cumulative  impact  of changing  federal  expenditures  is small  in 
that model, substantial  reductions  in expected  loss might  be obtained  by 
using  the fiscal  tool as well as the monetary  one. 
On the other  hand,  there  are  a priori  reasons  for believing  that  the actual 
impacts  are  positively  correlated-that  when  private  demand  is likely  to be 
very  sensitive  to fiscal  action,  it will also be sensitive  to monetary  action. 
If the  world  does  have  that  characteristic,  the  packaging  of fiscal  and  mone- 
tary  instruments  buys  less  insurance  than  appears  to be the case.  Although 
it is possible  to estimate  the mean and variance  of the impact  multipliers 
in a random  coefficients  model, I do not know how one would  go about 
estimating  the correlation  between  multipliers  in such a model. 
Other  considerations,  moreover,  modify  the  case  for packaging  policy  in- 
struments.  When  the  impact  of a particular  policy  instrument  is likely  to be 
correlated  with  the impact  of the shock  that  policy  is trying  to offset,  use of 
the instrument  may be especially  desirable.  Such a situation  emerges  in 
Okun's  example  of a decrease  in plant  and equipment  spending  that has a 
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a similar  initial  effect  on aggregate  demand  will be subject  to the same  con- 
sumption  uncertainties,  but they will be offsetting.  Similar  considerations 
apply to shocks in the financial  markets.  An activist  monetary  policy is 
particularly  desirable  to offset shifts in liquidity  preference  because  the 
impact  of the  policy  is likely  to be similar  to that  from  the disturbance,  even 
though, as in the investment  example,  both effects  may be unknown.  In 
this sense,  there  are asymmetries  between  fiscal  and monetary  policy. 
I agree  with  Okun  that  the instrument  for monetary  policy  does  not have 
to be perfectly  controlled  by the monetary  authority.  What  is important  is 
that it should  not bounce  around  in response  to systematic  feedbacks  from 
the real  sector;  that,  of course,  is the objection  to the use of interest  rates  as 
an instrument.  But I would  go further  than  Okun  and argue  that a precise 
definition  of the monetary  instrument  is not crucial  in an activist  strategy. 
Obviously,  a precise  definition  of the  instrument  is important  to a rules  pro- 
ponent.  The interest  rate  that is going to be fixed  must  be specified  if the 
Federal  Reserve  is operating  as it did prior  to the accord  of 1951,  and the 
money  concept  must  be explicitly  defined  if some  fixed  growth  of "money" 
is intended.  But for an activist,  it is not important  to decide  precisely  what 
handle  is to be turned  as  long  as decisions  on policy  are  frequently  reviewed. 
The key decision  is how to respond  in light of new information  about  the 
strength  of demand  for goods and  for financial  assets.  It is extremely  diffi- 
cult  in the very  short  run  to interpret  errors  in the forecast  of interest  rates 
or monetary  aggregates.  That  difficulty  creates  serious  problems,  but none 
of them  is solved  by an attachment  to one indicator  rather  than  another  as 
the direct  handle  for managing  monetary  policy. 
General  Discussion 
Leonall  Andersen  commented  on Okun's  application  of the St. Louis 
model. He stated  that the appropriate  course  of action  in response  to any 
shortfall  or overshoot  in GNP depended  on the type of shock  accounting 
for  the deviation.  Andersen  noted  three  kinds  of shocks:  (1) purely  random 
over  time;  (2) a structural  change;  and  (3) a single  shock  with effects  that 
could  last a long time.  Andersen  suggested  that everyone  would  agree  that 
policy should not be altered  in response  to the first type of shock, and 
should  be changed  in response  to the second  type.  The third  case  remained 
doubtful;  with  the desirability  of action  depending  on the time horizon  of 
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that further  discussion  and investigation  of these three types of shocks 
could  be fruitful. 
Robert Solow, however,  underlined  Okun's  point that on average  the 
disturbances  in the St. Louis  model  were  random  in first  differences.  They 
represent  a random  walk  that  starts  off  from  wherever  the  economy  happens 
to be. The first  type of shock  that Andersen  mentioned  would  imply ran- 
domness  in levels,  and  the model  did not reveal  such  a process. 
Several  participants  commented  on the interrelationship  between  fore- 
casting  accuracy  and policy strategy.  Lawrence  Klein felt that the analysis 
by Theil  that Okun  developed  tended  to downplay  forecasting  accuracy  to 
an extreme  degree.  Klein stressed  that nothing  helps the policy maker  as 
much as being right. In some situations,  the ability  to diagnose  the true 
state of the economy  has a major  impact  on the kind of policy action  that 
can  be recommended  and,  indeed,  on whether  any  action  can  be reasonably 
recommended  at all. Such a situation  prevailed  in the fourth quarter  of 
1970,  when  the General  Motors  work  stoppage  created  a quandary  as to the 
true state of the economy.  Martin  Bailey  urged  that serious  attention  be 
given  to the issue  of whether  forecasts  are  biased.  At turning  points  in eco- 
nomic fluctuations,  forecasters  tend to lag behind,  showing  a systematic 
bias  that would  impair  an activist  strategy.  Bailey  felt that  the treatment  of 
forecast  accuracy  was one of the very  few instances  in which  the paper  did 
not do justice  to the case in favor  of rules. 
Saul  Hymans  and  James  Duesenberry  also  felt  that  uncertainty  about  the 
direction  of the economy's  movement  was more serious  than uncertain- 
ties about the speed of movement.  In Duesenberry's  view, reversing  the 
direction  of instruments  imposed a particularly  high cost, and this cost 
would  interact  with  forecast  uncertainty  to call for a little  less activism  than 
Okun  had  indicated.  For example,  if GNP was  below  target  and  policy  was 
expansionary,  forecast  errors  that required  additional  boosts by policy 
probably  would have less serious  consequences  than errors  that overshot 
the mark  and forced  a reversal  of policy  toward  restraint.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances,  increased  confidence  in the forecast  of the level of activity 
would  encourage  the policy  maker  to make  larger  shifts  in the instruments. 
Duesenberry  felt that Okun's  paper was valuable  in identifying  issues 
that  could  be productively  discussed  and  debated,  so that  economists  could 
disagree  on specifics  rather  than by drawing  pictures  of totally different 
worlds.  He saw the possibility  of a convergence  of views, presenting  the 
choice  of more  or less reliance  on activism  rather  than all or none. A pro- 
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of the full employment  surplus  or the appropriate  growth  of money, and 
who was  willing  to learn  from  experience,  might  often  agree  with  an activist 
who was particularly  pessimistic  about his accuracy  in estimating  private 
demand  and  multipliers,  and  who was  particularly  concerned  about  instru- 
ment  costs.  William  Poole  also urged  that  the issues  be viewed  as matters  of 
degree.  He felt  that  the proper  questions  were  what  rules,  how  much  discre- 
tion, and  who should  have  the authority  for discretionary  decisions.  Poole 
noted, for example,  that Congress  had granted  far more discretion  to the 
Federal  Reserve  over  monetary  policy  than it had to the executive  branch 
with  respect  to fiscal  policy.  Some  reorientation  in both of these  areas  might 
make good sense,  Poole concluded. 
In the context  of locating  middle  ground  between  activists  and  rule  pro- 
ponents, Fand felt that strategies  of rules-within-bands-like  the initial 
formulation  of the Committee  for Economic  Development-were more 
promising  than  the paper  indicated.  Rules  proponents  feared  that, with  no 
constraints,  activists  would  be trigger-happy,  whereas  activists  feared  that 
rules  proponents  would  fall asleep  at the switch.  An agreement  to use dis- 
cretion  outside  of some  band  might  be a feasible  compromise,  according  to 
Fand. Okun, however,  expressed  greater  willingness  to compromise  by 
scaling  down the size of instrument  movements  rather  than by reducing 
their  frequency.  He reiterated  his concern  that  the strategy  of rules-within- 
bands  might  produce  the worst  of both worlds. 
Martin  Bailey  argued  that the irrationality  of government  was a larger 
problem  than Okun  had conceded.  On some occasions,  an administration 
may forgo opportunities  to improve  existing  legislation  because  it fears 
that Congress  would  add  undesirable  provisions,  bringing  on the so-called 
"Christmas  tree  effect."  Similarly,  even  though  rational  professional  policy 
makers  could, on occasions,  improve  fiscal and monetary  settings,  their 
programs  may  be distorted  by a Christmas  tree  effect  from  others  pursuing 
different  objectives,  contrary  to the public interest.  The federal  decision- 
making  process  is separated  and spread  across  a conglomerate  that is not 
subject  to the rationality  assumptions  that economists  attribute  to indi- 
viduals  or firms.  Solow  felt, however,  that  the very  irrational  elements  that 
Bailey  stressed  made  rules  a "nonstarter."  Because  of its decision-making 
processes,  the government  would  be most  unlikely  to stick  with  any  rule. 
Indeed,  Solow  wondered  whether,  in criticizing  the rules  position,  Okun 
had  taken  it too seriously  as a genuine  contender  for stabilization  strategy. 
Robert Hall shared  this misgiving;  he viewed  the position of rules pro- 
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be perverse  and  hence  that  it should  be minimized  and,  ideally,  eliminated. 
Okun  insisted,  nonetheless,  that  the rules  proponents  had had a significant 
influence  on policy  in 1969-71  and  could  not be dismissed.  In Okun's  judg- 
ment,  they had contributed  to an undue  delay in the adoption  of expan- 
sionary  fiscal  measures  and  to a distorted  focus  of monetary  policy on the 
setting  of instruments  rather  than  the state  of the economy. 
John Kareken  regarded  as the key characteristic  of the strategy  of rules 
without  feedback  the contention  that current  observations  of the economy 
contained  no information  that would  help  to guide  policy.  Any alternative 
strategy  makes  use of information  about  the current  economic  situation  in 
some systematic  way. If that way is fully systematized,  the alternative  to 
rules  without  feedback  can always  be interpreted  as a strategy  of rules  with 
feedback.  Kareken  urged  that the issue of stabilization  policy be posed in 
terms of these alternative  types of rules strategy  rather  than in terms  of 
rules  versus  discretion.  He felt  that  the  political  issues  came  into  perspective 
more  readily,  given  his formulation:  Would  policy  makers  be able  to imple- 
ment rules without feedback  more effectively  than rules with feedback? 
Charles  Holt and  William  Nordhaus  were  concerned  that  the strategy  of 
rules  without  feedback  had been contrasted  by Okun  with an alternative 
strategy  that appeared  to be entirely  judgmental.  Holt stressed  the need  to 
develop  formal  tools for implementing  an activist  policy, combining  and 
complementing  them with judgmental  devices.  Formalizing  the decision 
problem  requires  an objective  statement  of the various  targets  and  the rela- 
tive weight  placed  on them  and  of the penalties  associated  with  various  in- 
struments.  Delving into those issues would help distinguish  the areas  in 
which  we can deal  with  the various  problems  by formal  decision  rules  from 
those  in which  we have  an intuitive  grasp  of problems  that  we cannot  quan- 
tify precisely.  William  Nordhaus  saw  the issue  of action  versus  inaction  as 
the heart  of the paper  and urged  that it be kept distinct  from  the issue of 
rules  versus  discretion.  In  principle,  action  could  be predicated  as readily  on 
rules  with  feedback,  such  as those  developed  by A. W. Phillips,  as on judg- 
ment and discretion.  Okun agreed  with Holt and Nordhaus  that the ap- 
propriate  mixture  of judgmental  and  formal  elements  in an activist  strategy 
should  be explored;  he expressed  interest  in the development  of decision 
rules-or  at least decision guidelines-that involve feedback;  and con- 
sidered  such  development  part  of the agenda  for future  research,  following 
up on the critique  he now offered  of the strategy  that would  rely on rules 
without  feedback. 